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IN THE UTAH SUPRE1\1E COURT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
V.

Case No. 20150737-SC
DAVID M. RUSHTON,
Petitioner is not incarcerated.
Defendant/Petitioner.

INTRODUCTION
This case presents the question of whether the court of appeals correctly
interpreted the statutory definition of a "single criminal episode" to allow this prosecution
of Mr. Rushton after his prior guilty plea to offenses that were all incident to a single
criminal episode. Utah Code§ 76-1-401.
First, under the facts and circumstances of this case, "all conduct" of Mr. Rushton
was "incident to ... a single criminal objective." Utah Code§ 76-1-401. His single
criminal objective was the misappropriation of the money he controlled through
Fooptube, the company he owned and managed. See MISAPPROPRIATION, Black's
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) ("misappropriation" is "[t]he application of another's
property or money dishonestly to one's own use"). Where all the statutory terms were
met, the single criminal episode statute barred the state from subjecting Mr. Rushton to
the 2011 prosecution after his guilty plea in the 2009 prosecution.

Second, the court of appeals incorrectly interpreted Utah Code§ 76-1-401 to reject
Mr. Rushton's appeal. Rather than apply that statute's plain language to the facts of this
case, the court employed "a narrow interpretation" of a "single criminal episode" 2015
UT App 170,

,r,r 10-13, 20-22. The statute contains no such requirement; but the court

nonetheless engaged in its "narrow interpretation" in Mr. Rushton's case because he was
contesting multiple prosecutions, even though it would take "[a]n expansive view of
single criminal episode" in appeals from the state's joinder or severance of charges. Id. ,r,r
13-15. This approach is inconsistent with principles of statutory interpretation, and it
contravenes the plain language and purpose of the single criminal episode statutes. Mr.
Rushton's case is however, only the most recent one in which the court has employed this
incorrect approach to the single criminal episode statutes.
The court of appeals was incorrect to allow this prosecution of Mr. Rushton, and
incorrect to interpret Utah Code§ 76-1-401 as it did. This Court should reject the court of
appeals' narrow/expansive approach to the single criminal episode statute, reverse the
court of appeals' Rushton decision, and dismiss this prosecution.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The court of appeals issued State v. Rushton, 2015 UT App 170,354 P.3d 223 on
July 09, 2015. Addendum A. This Court granted certiorari on October 26, 2015.
Addendum B. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78A-3-102 (5).
OPINION BELOW
State v. Rushton, 2015 UT App 170,354 P.3d 223, is attached as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION.
Issue: This Court granted certiorari to review the following issue:
"Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's conclusion that
the crimes for which Petitioner was prosecuted in this case did not arise from the same
"single criminal episode" as the crimes prosecuted in a prior case that resulted in a guilty
plea." See Addendum B.
Standard ofReview: On certiorari, this Court reviews "the ultimate decision of the
court of appeals," which "merits no deference in [the] analysis." State v. Strieff, 2015 UT
2, iI 12 (citation omitted), certiorari granted, October 1, 2015. When a case "presents
legal questions of statutory interpretation," this court "consider[s] such issues de novo,
affording no deference to the district court's legal conclusions." Irving Place v. 628 Park
Ave., 2015 UT 91, ,I 11, --- P.3d ---. It is unclear what standard of review the court of
appeals applied in Rushton, but the result of its holding was a misinterpretation of the
single criminal episode statute, which this Court reviews for correctness.
Preservation: Petitioner preserved this issue in the trial court. See R.35-204
(motion to dismiss the 2011 prosecution, state's opposition, & reply); see also R.391
3

(transcript of the court's motion hearing); and R.318-23 (trial court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law). The findings and conclusions are in Addendum C.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The following are provided in Addendum D:
Utah Code§ 76-1-401

"Single Criminal Episode" defined--Joinder of
offenses and defendants.

Utah Code§ 76-1-402

Separate offenses arising out of single criminal
episode--Included offenses.

Utah Code § 7 6-1-403

Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution
for offense out of same episode. 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On April 20, 2011, the state charged David Rushton in Salt Lake District Court
case 111903023 (the 2011 prosecution), with: two counts of communications fraud
(second degree felonies under Utah Code§ 76-10-1801); two counts of unlawful dealing
of property by a fiduciary (second degree felonies under Utah Code§ 76-6-513); two
counts of theft of services (second degree felonies under Utah Code§ 76-6-409); and one
count of engaging in a pattern of unlawful activity (a second degree felony under Utah
Code § 76-10-1603). R.1-6. The state amended its charges, adding twelve failure to pay
wages counts, all class A misdemeanors under Utah Code§ 34-28-12, in the alternative
to the theft of services charges. R.24-32 (Addendum E). These charges stemmed from
Mr. Rushton's conduct while he owned and managed Fooptube, L.L.C., the computer
programming and design company he began with his wife in 2005. R.5,82.

The 2013 amendment to Utah Code § 7 6-1-403 has no bearing on this appeal.
4

Previously, on June 24, 2010, Mr. Rushton pleaded guilty to other charges that the
2

state brought in Salt Lake District Court case 091903070 (the 2009 prosecution). Those
charges were for: one count of failing to file Fooptube's quarterly corporate tax returns
for the 2007-2008 tax year (a third degree felony under Utah Code§ 76-8-1 lOl(l)(c));
one count of intent to evade paying Fooptube's withholding tax obligations for the 20072008 tax year (a second degree felony under Utah Code §76-8-1 lOl(l)(d)); one count of
unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary for failing to remit withholding taxes for
Fooptube's employees for the 2007-2008 tax year (a second degree felony under Utah
Code §76-6-513); one count of communications fraud for faking Fooptube's W-2 forms
and withholding-tax statements to employees in 2008 (a second degree felony under Utah
Code § 7 6-10-1801); one count of failing to render proper tax returns (personal) for 2006
through 2008 (a third degree felony under Utah Code§ 76-8-1 lOl(l)(c)); and one count
of engaging in a pattern of unlawful activity from March 2007 through June 2008, (a

...,
.'',)

second degree felony under Utah Code§ 76-10-1603). R.78-84 (Addendum F) .
Mr. Rushton was arraigned on December 14, 2009. R.92. He pleaded guilty to two
counts: one of failing to render a tax return and one of engaging in a pattern of unlawful
activity. R.80,167. He was sentenced December 13, 2010. R.99.
Mr. Rushton moved to dismiss the 2011 prosecution, arguing the single criminal
episode statutes barred the state from subjecting him to multiple prosecutions for charges
arising from a single criminal episode. R.35-135. The trial court denied Mr. Rushton's

2

The state also charged Ms. Rushton with the same offenses, but those charges
were dropped through Mr. Rushton's plea deal in the 2009 prosecution. R.167-77.
5

motion. R.321. Mr. Rushton entered a conditional guilty plea in the 2011 prosecution.
R.223;225-35; see also State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938-40 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). Mr.
Rushton was sentenced October 12, 2012, and he timely appealed. R.304-06,334-35.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. See

Rushton, 2015 UT App 170. This Court granted Mr. Rushton's petition for certiorari.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Background
In 2005, David Rushton and his wife began Fooptube, L.L.C., which like their
prior company SensorySweep, was a computer programming and design company.
R.5,58-59,82,117,122,227.
In 2008, the state began to investigate Fooptube, through the Utah State Tax
Commission's Criminal Investigation Unit and Special Agent Scott Mann. R.54-61
(Addendum G). Agent Mann learned in this investigation that Mr. Rushton made all the
decisions at Fooptube, including "decisions of who was to be paid and who was not to be
paid," and "the decision to delay or not to pay the [retirement] contributions." R.59,117.
That investigation began after the Utah State Tax Commission's unsuccessful attempts to
resolve the non-payment of Fooptube's withholding taxes. R.58. Mann's investigation
soon revealed that Mr. Rushton had withheld those taxes from the paychecks of Fooptube
employees, but failed to remit them to the state, and failed to file related taxes with the
Commission. R.82. Eventually, these employees were credited for unpaid withholdingtaxes. R.83. Agent Mann also learned that Mr. Rushton failed to remit Fooptube's
corporate taxes and his personal returns. R.58-59,81-84,168,58.
6
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Agent Mann also learned what Mr. Rushton had done with these improperly
withheld monies, that he "used and continued to use the improperly/fraudulently
retained/converted funds to further [the] business enterprise as well as for []personal
use," and that he "had control over the aforementioned-business organization and the
funds generated from such organization have been used, at least in part, to help continue
such operation and/or continue the unlawful criminal activity." R.83.
"During this [2008] investigation," Agent Mann also "became aware of a criminal
investigation being conducted by the Department of Labor's Employee Benefits Security
Administration (EBSA)," involving "allegations that Fooptube had failed to remit
employee's contributions to a traditiona1401K and Roth 401K pension plan being
operated by Fooptube LLC." R.58. Mr. Rushton administrated Fooptube's employee
retirement fund, and "[t]he EBSA investigation revealed that Rushton had failed to remit
contributions to the [Fooptube] plan for a period of February 2007 through October
2008," in the amount of "$107,000 in funds to the pension plan as required by the plan's
policy." R.58-59. Mann also learned that Mr. Rushton "knew that he was supposed to
deposit the funds immediately into the plan's account," and he knew "he was responsible
for the decision to delay or not to pay the contributions." R.59. 3

3

The United States Department of Labor also charged Mr. Rushton on November
15, 2010, with failing to remit payments to Fooptube's 401(k) Profit Sharing plan. See
Solis v. David Rushton, Fooptube, LLC, and the Fooptube, LLC 40l(k) Profit Sharing
Plan, Case 2:10-cv-01128-TC. The Department obtained a default judgment for
$107,310.91 plus back interest of $7,497.22, and post-judgment interest in that case on
April 26, 2011, which was only six days after the state filed its 2011 prosecution. This
case was available to the state in the public record.
7

The EBSA case was resolved via a consent injunction entered on January 29,

/-,,_

~

2009, and then with an Amended Consent Injunction filed February 18, 2009. R.56,7076. That amended injunction showed that the EBSA investigation involved wage claims
against Mr. Rushton and Fooptube as well. R.70-76. That injunction required Mr.
Rushton to payback-wages of $942,429.09 by August 10, 2009. R.72. And it required
him to continue paying Fooptube employees a minimum wage for the hours they worked,
and to account in detail for Fooptube's earned income. R.71,72. The injunction also
enjoined Fooptube from selling commerce (video games, etc.), except under certain
conditions, until it "paid back all the back wages due to employees and are paying current
employees." R.72. Notably, the unpaid wages involved in that federal case included
wages from October 2008 through January 2009. R.73.
Agent Mann also learned of wage claims by Fooptube employees when, during his
investigation, "the Utah Labor Commission [] contacted [Agent Mann] and advised that
the subjects had committed theft of services from approximately 84 individuals who had
worked for the company [Fooptube] between October 2008 and October 2009,"
specifically the "pay periods from October 1, 2008 through December 31 of2009." R.58.
Mann also said Fooptube's management team had "admitted many times" to him that
"the company had issued payroll checks that they knew could not be covered by the
funds in the bank accounts." R.59. And that even as Fooptube missed "payroll for current
employees" it "continued to hire additional employees and operated through the year of
2009." R.58. As reflected by default orders from the Utah Labor Commission, filed in
November 2009, Fooptube and Mr. Rushton, Fooptube's employees began filing wage
8

claims in early 2009. See R.65-67. Agent Mann knew of Mr. Rushton's tax, wage, and
retirement misappropriations before the state filed the 2009 prosecution. R.58.
These offenses were interrelated, as Fooptube's employees said Mr. Rushton had
stopped remitting their retirement money held in trust so that he could continue to pay
their wages. See R.243 (Former Fooptube employee stating at sentencing, that in the
summer of 2008 employees they learned their "401K contributions had not been going
into our individual plans ... apparently as Dave [Rushton] tried to continue paying
people wages with it instead''). Their paychecks began to bounce in June or July of 2008
(R.252); and that their the paychecks were late throughout 2008. R.246. Eventually, "95
employees reported wages of $1,170,164.07 that had not been paid." R.58-59.
The State's 2009 Prosecution ofMr. Rushton
On April 14, 2009, the state via Mark Baer, an assistant Utah Attorney General,
filed charges against Mr. Rushton for tax offenses. R. 78-84. The state alleged that Mr.
Rushton misappropriated the withholdings collected from Fooptube employees through
their paychecks, by failing to remit either the withholdings or the related tax returns to the
State of Utah in 2007 and 2008. R.78-79. They also charged communications fraud for
devising a scheme to defraud Fooptube employees by issuing fraudulent W-2 forms and
withholding-tax statements to file their income taxes. R. 79. He was also charged with
failing to file personal tax returns for the 2005-2007 tax years, and for engaging in a
pattern of unlawful activity. R.80.
Agent Mann set forth and signed the probable cause statement accompanying the
state's 2009 Information. R.84. He alleged that Mr. Rushton "ran the company," and
9

"asserted control over [Fooptube] and the funds generated from [Fooptube] have been
used, at least in part, to help continue such operation and/or continue the unlawful
criminal activity." R.8. Mann also said Mr. Rushton "used and continued to use the
improperly/fraudulently retained/converted funds to further the[] business enterprise as
well as for[] personal use. R.83.
Less than a month after the 2009 charges were filed, at a May 5, 2009 review
hearing, the prosecutor (Mark Baer) was approached by several Fooptube employees.
R.140. They informed Mr. Baer of their wage claims against Fooptube and Mr. Rushton,
which they had filed earlier in 2009. R.140. They followed him to his office where they
met with "Mr. Scott Mann along with Mr. Baer." R.141. The state never amended its
2009 information, and Mr. Rushton was arraigned on December 14, 2009. R.92.
On June 24, 2010, Mr. Rushton pleaded guilty in the 2009 prosecution to two
counts pursuant to a plea agreement in which he also agreed to pay "restitution on all
counts originally charged in this criminal case," among other conditions R.167-77. He
was sentenced on December 13, 2010, to consecutive sentences of both one-to-fifteen
years, and zero-to-five years, to 200 hours of community service, six years of probation,
180 days in jail, he was ordered to pay full restitution of $1,005,245.00, plus interest, and
Mr. Rushton was committed to the jail that day. R.99-100.

The State's 2011 Prosecution ofMr. Rushton

10
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Only four months after Mr. Rushton's sentencing, the state filed this case on April
20, 2011. R.1-6. The 2011 charges alleged that Mr. Rushton:
•

Committed two counts of communications fraud in 2008 and 2009, by
"devis[ing] a scheme or artifice to obtain or defraud money from the
defendants' employee compensation and/or retirement arrangements via
false pretenses, representations, promises or omissions and did
communicate such false promises or false or fraudulent pretenses with
said employees;" and that he

•

Committed two counts of unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary, in
2008 and 2009, when "as a fiduciary for his company[he] did obtain and
deal with employee wages and/or retirement funds in excess of
$5,000.00 which had been entrusted to him and did fail to remit the
same;" and

•

Committed two counts of theft of services, when "as the
owner/manager/operator of Fooptube, LLC," he failed to pay 95 or
more of Fooptube's employees, in 2008 and 2009; and

•

•

Committed twelve failure to pay wages counts from October 2008
through October 2009, (in the alternative to the theft of services
· charges); and
Engaged in in a pattern of unlawful activity with the first three charges
predicate offenses.

R.24-29.
Agent Mann set forth and signed the probable cause statement accompanying the
2011 Information. R.29-32. He reviewed records from the Utah State Tax Commission
and other state agencies. R.30-31. Consistent with what Fooptube employees and the
Utah Labor Commission had already told him, he noted that "Utah Labor Commission
records ... reflect that Fooptube employees have made wage claims against the company
... exceeding $1,170,164.00. R.31. Mann said Mr. Rushton also "failed to remit funds
collected from employees for the purpose of depositing them into retirement funds (a
11

401K and/or Roth 401K pension fund accounts)," while "he knew he should have
remitted those funds.'' R.32. These "activities," Mann said, were "a regular part/pattern of
his business operation," and Mr. Rushton "did improperly keep and/or use such funds as
part of the funds within and sustaining his business, Fooptube, LLC." R.6.
As in the 2009 prosecution, Mann said Mr. Rushton "used and continued to use
the improperly/fraudulently retained/converted funds, both funds that were due and
owing as wages and/or funds that were part of the employees retirement funds, to further
his business enterprise and/or for personal use." R.32. And that Mr. Rushton "asserted
control over the aforementioned business organization and the funds generated from such
organization have been used, at least in part, to help continue such operation and/or
continue the unlawful criminal activity." R.32; see also R.6 (same).

The Motion to Dismiss the 2011 Prosecution Under the Single Criminal Episode Statutes
Mr. Rushton moved to dismiss the 2011 prosecution under the single criminal
episode statutes bar against multiple prosecutions. R.35-135. The state, via Mark Baer,
objected and filed a personal affidavit. R.143-66. Relying on State v. Sommerville for the
statutory elements, the state conceded both that Mr. Rushton's first prosecution resulted
in a conviction, and that the cases were under one court's jurisdiction. R.151-52 (citing
2010 UT App 336)); see also Utah Code§§ 76-1-403 (l)(b)(ii) and 76-1-402(2)(a)). The
state argued that Mr. Rushton's motion should be denied because "the prosecuting
attorney was not made aware of the presently charged offenses until May 5, 2009, which
was after arraignment in the initial case." R.152; but see R.92 (Mr. Rushton was
arraigned on December 14, 2009 in the 2009 prosecution). The state also claimed the
12

underlying offenses were not incident to a single criminal objective where they affect
"multiple and differing victims." R.152. 4
The trial court heard argument on the motion. R.391. Then it issued written
findings and conclusions. R.318-23. The trial court correctly agreed with the state's two
concessions, and also correctly found that the state knew of the 2011 offenses before Mr.
Rushton was arraigned in the 2009 prosecution. R.321. Further, it was correct to find that
Mr. Rushton's conduct underlying the prosecutions "was closely related in time," under
Utah Code§ 76-1-401. R.321. That court denied Mr. Rushton's motion, however, on the
basis of its incorrect determination that "[t]he offenses underlying each case were not
incident to the accomplishment of a single criminal objective as defined by the Statute
and related case law because the offense in each case involved different victims" and
therefore "defendant has failed to satisfy" the single criminal episode statute. R.321.
Mr. Rushton entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of attempted unlawful
dealing with property of a fiduciary, one payment of wages violation, and one count of
pattern of unlawful activity. R.223,225-34. In pleading, he also again agreed to pay
"restitution on all years originally charged in this criminal case," and to do 300 more
hours of community service. R.231. At sentencing, the trial court noted Mr. Rushton's
"criminal activity" in this and the 2009 prosecution was "related." R.358. The court said
sentencing was "never an easy task," but it was even harder in Mr. Rushton's case as

4

In post-conviction proceedings, the prosecutor recently asked the trial court to
combine the 2009 and 2011 proceeding, claiming the "two cases are interrelated, both
historically and factually, and it would be in the interest of justice and efficiency that
[these] cases be combined." See Docket, Salt Lake District Court case 111903023.
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"there's an argument, at least, that even though the law was violated ... the violation
wasn't done maliciously necessarily, but done with the hope that somehow someway,
money may miraculously appear and rescue the company and allow the employees to be
paid back what they were" owed. R.324:22. Mr. Rushton was sentenced to concurrent
prison terms of zero-to-five years, suspended, with six years of probation and 365 days in
jail, and ordered him to pay $1,214,614.00 plus interest in restitution. R.304-05. 5

The Court ofAppeals' Opinion
On appeal, the court of appeals correctly recognized "the only issue before us in
assessing whether the tax case and the wage case arose from a single criminal episode is
whether the conduct underlying those charges was 'incident to an attempt or an
accomplishment of a single criminal objective."' Rushton, 2015 UT App 170,

iJ 16

( quoting Utah Code § 76-1-401)). The court of appeals addressed this issue by
"employing a narrow interpretation of single criminal episode" in Mr. Rushton' s appeal,
even as it determined it would "us[ e] a more expansive interpretation in" appeals
involving the joinder of multiple charges in a single criminal episode. Id.

ilil 13-15,20-23.

To support this narrow/expansive approach to the term "single criminal episode,"
the court categorized cases involving the term "single criminal episode." Id.

ilil 10-12.

The first category included cases involving double jeopardy and the question of whether
"a defendant's conduct could be charged as more than one offense or []only a single
offense." Id. (citations omitted). Those cases included State v. James, 631 P.2d 854 (Utah

5

Mr. Rushton continues to pay $510 per month in restitution. See Docket, Salt Lake
District Court case 091903070.
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1981); State v. Rasabout, 2013 UT App 71,299 P.3d 625; State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61
(Utah Ct.App.1989); and State v. Bauer, 792 N.W.2d 825 (Minn.2011). Id.
The second category comprised only the Utah Court of Appeals' cases where, as
in Mr. Rushton's appeal, a defendant claimed that offenses arising from a single criminal
episode "must be tried together." Id. (citing West Valley City v. Parkinson, 2014 UT App
140,329 P.3d 833; State v. Selzer, 2013 UT App 3,294 P.3d 617; State v. Strader, 902
P.2d 638 (Utah Ct.App.1995)). Then, the court's third category included cases where a
defendant argued offenses were not in a single criminal episode and must "be tried
separately." Id. (citing State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, 27 P.3d 1115; State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d
39 (Utah Ct.App.1990)). 6
In assigning these categories, the court noted that either a "narrow interpretation"
or an "expansive interpretation" of a "single criminal episode." Rushton, 2015 UT App
170, ,J,r 9-12. In its first category of double jeopardy cases, the court of appeals
determined "the courts have taken 'a very narrow perspective, focusing on whether a
subsequent prosecution is for the same offense' as the first prosecution." Id.

iJ 10

(emphasis added) (citing Strader, 902 P.2d at 642). 7 Then, in its second category, the
court concluded the issue of "whether separate offenses arising from a single criminal
6

The court of appeals acknowledged "no prior case appears to have explicitly
categorized the existing case law as we have done here," but it decided, "Utah appellate
courts have long utilized these categories in analyzing the questions that arise under the
single criminal episode statutes." Rushton, 2015 UT App 170, iJ 15. That was not
accurate as the "courts" it referenced for having "long utilized these categories" were its
own cases of Parkinson, Selzer, and Strader. Id.
7

Strader was not a double jeopardy case, but it originated the court of appeals'
narrow/expansive approach to the term "single criminal episode." 902 P.2d at 642.
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episode must be prosecuted together" is "comparable to asserting double jeopardy,"
making it'" 'appropriate to take a narrow, rather than an expansive, view of what [a
single criminal episode] entails.' ' "Id.

,r 11

(quoting Strader, 902 P.2d at 642; and

Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, ,r 26). But in the third category-"where appellate courts are
concerned with whether the mandatory joinder of multiple charges in a single prosecution
deprives one or both parties of a fair trial"-the court decided, "[a]n expansive
interpretation of 'single criminal episode' is appropriate." Id.

,r 12 (citing Strader, 902

P.2d at 641). The court of appeals offered an unclear explanation for its narrow/expansive
distinction. See id.

,r,r 13-14.

The court cabined Mr. Rushton's appeal in the second category, determining
"[c]ases in the second category are most useful because they are directly on point." Id. ,I
15. It used a "narrow interpretation of single criminal episode" in Mr. Rushton' s case,
concluding "that as in Parkinson and Strader, Rushton's actions in the wage case and the
tax case were not incident to the accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Id.

,r 20

(citing Parkinson, 2014 UT App 140; and Strader, 902 P.2d 638). Under this narrow
approach the court affirmed the district court's finding. Id.

,r 20. Even though it

acknowledged Mr. Rushton's "criminal objective in each case was to steal money to
which he was not entitled," the court of appeals concluded "[t]he narrow label of single
criminal objective is not meant to encompass such a broad criminal goal because if it did,
then almost any series of crimes committed for the purpose of illegally obtaining money,
say to feed a drug habit, could be described as 'single."' Id.
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,r 21.

G

The court of appeals concluded, "[ i]n short, Rushton has not shown that the
district court erred in deciding as it did," and "although 'other possible interpretations of
[the defendant's] actions may be possible, the district court could certainly have accepted
the State's argument and determined that the [offenses] did not share a single criminal
objective."' Id. ,I 24 (quoting Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, if 27. The court of appeals
"affirm[ed] the district court's determination that Rushton's actions in the wage case were
not incident to or in furtherance of his purpose in the tax case because the two sets of
charges did not share a single criminal objective." Id. ,I 25. This court granted certiorari.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In violation of Utah's single criminal episode statutes (Utah Code§§ 76-1-401
through -403), the court of appeals allowed the state to subject Mr. Rushton to a
subsequent prosecution after he had pleaded guilty in a different prosecution to offenses
that all arose from the same criminal episode. A plain language interpretation of Utah
Code§ 76-1-401 reveals that Mr. Rushton's conduct was all "incident to ... the
accomplishment of a single criminal objective" to misappropriate money in the context of
Fooptube. Fooptube was where Mr. Rushton owned, managed, and controlled every
decision. His continuing decisions not to pay money that Fooptube owed, and to use it
elsewhere, were the basis of the state's charges in 2009 and 2011. Where Mr. Rushton's
conduct underlying the offenses in both prosecutions was "incident to ... an
accomplishment of a single criminal objective," the single criminal episode statute barred
the state's subsequent prosecution of him. Utah Code§ 76-1-401.
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The court of appeals was incorrect to reject his claim by interpreting the single
criminal episode "employing a narrow interpretation of single criminal episode."

Rushton, 2015 UT App 170, ,r 13. The court took a "narrow" interpretation of in Mr.
Rushton's case because he was contesting multiple prosecutions, even as it determined it
would take "[a]n expansive view of single criminal episode" in appeals contesting the
state's joinder or severance of charges. Id.

,r,r 13-15. That interpretation is incorrect as the

plain language and ordinary meaning of Utah Code§ 76-1-401 is not concerned with a
narrow or expansive approach. Rather that language directs the focus to the defendant's
conduct that is "closely related in time," to determine if it is also "incident to ... an
accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Utah Code§ 76-1-401. The court of
appeals was incorrect to narrowly interpret those terms, particularly where Utah's
statutory bar on multiple prosecutions for offenses in a single criminal episode, is
intended to both expand double jeopardy and protect defendants from the unfairness of
multiple prosecutions.
Under the facts of this case, the plain language and purpose of the single criminal
episode statutes barred the state's subsequent prosecution of Mr. Rushton after his guilty
plea. This Court should dismiss this prosecution of Mr. Rushton.

ARGUMENT
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1. The court of appeals was incorrect to "narrowly" interpret the
term "single criminal episode" to allow the state's subsequent
prosecution of Mr. Rushton for offenses that arose from the
same criminal episode as the offenses the state had prosecuted
him for in a prior case that resulted in a guilty plea.
Due process is violated when a party is denied fundamental fairness. Cf City of
Spartanburg v. Parris, 251 S.C. 187, 191 (1968). Utah's single criminal episode statutes

are meant to ensure this idea of fundamental fairness. See Utah Code§§ 76-1-401, -402,
and -403. The state unfairly subjected Mr. Rushton to separate prosecutions for offenses
that were all part of a single criminal episode. The court of appeals was incorrect to
"narrowly" interpret the term "single criminal episode" to allow the state's subsequent
prosecution of Mr. Rushton. Rushton, 2015 UT App 170.

A. The Single Criminal Episode Statutes' Bar on Multiple
Prosecutions.
Three statutory provisions that set forth the terms under which "a defendant shall
not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses ... arising out of a single criminal
episode." Utah Code§§ 76-1-402(1)(2). The terms that must exist are:
1. "The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court," (Utah
Code§ 76-l-402(2)(a));
2. "The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment," (Utah
Code§ 76-l-402(2)(b));
3. "[T]he former prosecution ... resulted in conviction," (Utah Code
§§ 76-1-403(1), (l)(a),(l)(b)(ii)), which includes "a plea of guilty
accepted by the court" (Utah Code§ 76-1-403(3)); and
4. The offenses are part of a "single criminal episode," which includes:
a. "all conduct which is closely related in time," and
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b. "incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single
criminal objective" (Utah Code§ 76-1-401).
As this Court has noted, the statutes "impose a one-bite-at-the-apple rule for
multiple offenses arising out of a single criminal episode." State v. Ririe, 2015 UT 37, ,r
8, 345 P.3d 1261. When these terms are present, the statute is unequivocal, "a subsequent
prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out of the same criminal episode is
barred." Utah Code§ 76-1-403(1).
These statutory terms all existed in Mr. Rushton's case. The trial court and court
of appeals were correct to find that both the prosecutions were under the same court's
jurisdiction, the 2009 prosecution resulted in conviction, the state knew of all the offenses
before Mr. Rushton was arraigned on the 2009 information, and the conduct was closely
related in time. R.320-21. See generally Rushton, 2015 UT App 170. 8 Both courts were
incorrect to deny Mr. Rushton's motion to dismiss this prosecution based on the
8

Mr. Rushton's conduct was "closely related in time." Utah Code§ 76-1-401. The
trial court correctly found that it was (R.321), which the court of appeals was correct to
affirm. Rushton, 2015 UT App 170, ,r 8 n.5 ("[t]he State also argues that the charges were
not closely related in time" but "does not directly challenge the district court's finding
that they were"). Our courts have interpreted "closely related in time" to require
"temporal proximity." Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, ,r 25. Moreover, where an "overarching
scheme" manifests "a single, clear, criminal objective, the timing between the two
incidents is not as crucial." Mead, 2001 UT 58, ,r 56, n.10.
Mr. Rushton's conduct was an "overarching scheme" of continuous conduct from
2006 through 2009. Mr. Rushton's offenses also necessarily require time to occur, as
taxes are (un)paid annually, and wages and retirement contributions are paid on monthly
schedules. See State v. Gibson, 37 Utah 330, 108 P. 349, 350 (1910) (continuous
embezzlements over a period of time may constitute one continuous transaction); see also
State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 645 (Utah 1996) ("[A]lthough the transactions underlying
Crosby's theft convictions occurred over a period of time, they were part of a single plan
and should have been charged as a single offense"). The state also regularly prosecutes
business offenses committed over years in a single criminal episode, with a single
prosecution. See n.11, infra.
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determination that his conduct was not "incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a
single criminal objective." Utah Code § 76-1-401.
B. Under the plain language of Utah Code§ 76-1-401, construed
in light of the single criminal episode statutes' purpose in
barring multiple prosecutions for offenses in a single criminal
episode, Mr. Rushton 's conduct was incident to the
accomplishment of a single criminal objective, and the statutes
barred the state's re-prosecution after his guilty plea.
When faced with a question of statutory interpretation, a court's "primary goal is
to effectuate the intent of the Legislature," and "[t]he best evidence of the Legislature's
intent is the statute's plain language." Meza v. State, 2015 UT 70, ,r 10, 359 P.3d 592
(quotation omitted)). Where Utah Code§ 76-1-401 readily yields itself to a plain
language interpretation, this Court "begin[s] with the plain language of the provision at
issue in [a] broader effort to ascertain the intent of the Legislature disclosed by the
language of the act as a whole, the act's operation, and its purpose." State v. Rasabout,
2015 UT 72, ,r 10, 356 P.3d 1258. Under the plain language of Utah Code§ 76-1-401, as
influenced by the statutory purpose in barring multiple prosecutions, the facts of this case
make patent that Mr. Rushton's conduct was "incident to an attempt or an
accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Utah Code§ 76-1-401.
That interpretation of the statute is confirmed by the ordinary meaning of those
terms. See State v. Canton, 2013 UT 44, ,r 13,308 P.3d 517 (to determine "the ordinary
meaning of nontechnical terms of a statute," this Court's "starting point is the dictionary"
(quotation omitted)); Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ,r 12 (same). In this case a dictionary
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dictates "the meaning that the statutory terms must bear in this context." Canton, 2013
UT 44, ,I 14 (quotation omitted). 9

The Plain Language
Under Utah law, a "single criminal episode" includes "all conduct," or all
"[p]ersonal behavior, whether by action or inaction, verbal or nonverbal; the manner in
which a person behaves; collectively, a person's deeds." CONDUCT, Black's Law
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Including "all conduct" indicates an intent to consider a range
of behavior, actions, and inactions. The only limitations on that conduct are specified by
the statute, which requires that it be both "closely related in time and incident to an
attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective." 76-1-401.
That phrase "incident to" means something is "[ d]ependent upon, subordinate to,
arising out of, or otherwise connected with (something else, usu. of greater importance)."
Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, 830 (Random House 2d ed. 2001). Our courts
understand this term in the context of the Fourth Amendment, which is a consistent with
the single criminal episode statute's understanding of "incident to." See, e.g., State v.

Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1118 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (noting the terms "incident to arrest"

9

The language of Utah Code§ 76-1-401 is clear and "cannot reasonably be
understood to have more than one meaning," therefore, "it is not ambiguous." Arnold v.
Grigsby, 2009 UT 88, ,I 19,225 P.3d 192. The state has never argued this language was
ambiguous; and in Rushton, the court of appeals neither addressed its plain language nor
suggested it was ambiguous. If this Court's "recourse to traditional tools of statutory
construction leaves any doubt about the meaning of' those terms, it should "invoke the
rule that 'ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor
oflenity."' Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1088 (2015) (citations omitted);
Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ,I 22 (same). Lenity comports with the purpose of Utah's
statutory bar against multiple prosecutions for offenses in a single criminal episode.
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mean "in other words, the search must be conducted pursuant to a lawful arrest and
cannot be remote in time or place from the arrest." (quotations omitted)). An
"accomplishment" is "[a]n act or instance of carrying into effect; fulfillment." Webster's
Unabridged Dictionary, 12 (Random House 2d ed. 2001). Thus the statute requires that
the defendant's conduct be connected to the defendant's "single criminal objective."
To be "single" is to "[c]onsist of one alone," or be "individual." SINGLE, Black's
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). An "objective" is "something that one's efforts or
actions are intended to attain or accomplish; purpose; goal; target." Id. at 1360. That
objective must of course be criminal, or single objective "[o ]f, relating to, or involving a
crime; in the nature of a crime." CRIMINAL, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
Thus and under the plain language and ordinary meaning of the terms of Utah
Code§ 76-1-401, the test for a single criminal objective requires focusing on the
defendant's conduct, to ascertain whether it is both connected in time, and connected by a
single criminal purpose, goal, or target, that the defendant's conduct is intended to attain
or accomplish. See Parkinson, 2014 UT App 140, il 7 (correctly noting the statute
"focuses more on a defendant's actions, that is, whether the two sets of charges arose out
of actions that were 'incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal
objective."' (quoting Utah Code§ 76-1-401)). This interpretation of Utah Code§ 76-1401 is supported by our cases that have correctly interpreted that statute.
In Mead, for example, this Court looked to the defendant's conduct to see his
"single criminal objective" and determined, "[t]here can be no doubt that the solicitation
and murder charges share an identical criminal objective: the death of' the victim. 2001
23

UT 58, iJ 56. In looking to the defendant's conduct this Court noted that even though his
actions occurred over time, they were only "separate manifestations of [a] single, ongoing
criminal objective" and was all part of his "overarching scheme to rid himself of his
wife." Id.; see also Commonwealth. v. Hude, 458 A.2d 177, 181 (Pa. 1983) (noting,
"[g]enerally, charges against a defendant are clearly related in time and require little
analysis to determine that a single criminal episode exists," but "in defining what acts
constitute a single criminal episode, not only is the temporal sequence of events
important, but also the logical relationship between the acts must be considered."); see
also State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah 1985) (two separate burglaries, first of an
apartment complex' s laundry room then an apartment were "committed during a single
criminal episode").
t~:
Vil

That same focus on the defendant's conduct may also appropriately result in a
court allowing the subsequent prosecution. See, e.g., State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d 1206,
1207 (Utah 1977) (no shared objective where the defendant's "criminal objective of
robbery was entirely different than that of kidnapping which was totally disconnected in
time, place or purpose"); State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1977) (no single
criminal episode where the defendant's conduct showed the "objective of the unlawful
taking was to obtain possession, be it permanent or temporary, of another's automobile,"
while "[t]he objective of the failure to stop was to avoid arrest for the traffic violations he
had just committed and/or to avoid being found in a stolen motor vehicle").
Although Utah's statutory bar on multiple prosecutions is somewhat unique-all
states prohibit double jeopardy but not all prohibit multiple prosecutions under the same
24

terms-states with similar statutes also focus on the defendant's conduct to ascertain a
single criminal objective. For example, Oregon's statute defines a "[c]riminal episode" as
"continuous and uninterrupted conduct that establishes at least one offense and is so
joined in time, place and circumstances that such conduct is directed to the
accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Or. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 131.505. As
Oregon's Supreme Court held, this language reveals "the legislature's view of the critical
factor in treating criminal conduct as a unitary event," which is "not the coincidence of
'time, place and circumstances' ... but the resulting inference that the conduct is
'directed to the accomplishment of a single criminal objective."' State v. Cloutier, 286
Or. 579, 595, 596 P.2d 1278 (1979); see also id at 596 (noting Oregon's Legislature has
"chosen to attach importance to the 'singleness' of a defendant's criminal objective rather
than only to the 'singleness' of his acts.").
Pennsylvania's statutory bar on multiple prosecutions does not define a "single
criminal episode," but its courts have endeavored to do so. See 18 Pa. Stat. and Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 110; see also Hude, 458 A.2d 177 at 182 ("in defining what acts constitute a
single criminal episode, not only is the temporal sequence of events important, but also
the logical relationship between the acts must be considered, but stressing (at 491-92) that
"the definition of a 'single criminal episode' should not be limited to acts which are
immediately connected in time," since by "requiring that criminal acts be logically
related instead of temporally related, the courts will be better able to implement the
policies which the "single criminal episode" test is designed to promote").
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The clearest reading of the Utah Code's definition of a "single criminal episode"
is, to look to the facts and circumstances of a case, to find evidence of a defendant's
temporarily-related conduct, to ascertain whether it is intended to attain or accomplish a
single criminal purpose, goal, or target. Utah Code § 76-1-401.
This interpretation comports with the purpose of the single criminal episode
statutes' bar against multiple prosecutions, which both ensures that a defendant is
properly prosecuted for the offenses committed in any single criminal episode, but also
that s/he is not harassed by repeatedly having to defend against harassing and inefficient
prosecutions.
The single criminal episode statutes' purpose has an influence on the plain language.
A Court's "plain language analysis is not so limited that [it will] only inquire into
individual words and subsections in isolation," rather the "interpretation of a statute
requires that each part or section be 'construed in connection with every other part or
section so as to produce a harmonious whole" and "the purpose of the statute has an
influence on the plain meaning of a statute." Anderson v. Bell, 2010 UT 47, iJ 9,234 P.3d
1147 (quotation omitted) (emphasis original). Where Utah Code§ 76-1-401 is
incorporated into the other provisions that collectively bar multiple prosecutions for
offenses in a single criminal episode. See Utah Code§§ 76-1-403(2), 76-1-402(2). Thus,
the plain language of 76-1-401 must be construed in harmony with the underlying
purpose behind the statutory bar on multiple prosecutions.
At its heart, the purpose behind this procedural bar is a concern for the
fundamental fairness required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
26

Cf Ciucci v. State ofIll., 356 U.S. 571,575 (1958) Douglas J. and Brennan J., dissenting
(noting the state's use of three consecutive trials was "an unseemly and oppressive use of
a criminal trial that violates the concept of due process contained in the Fourteenth
Amendment, whatever its ultimate scope is taken to be"); Hoag v. State ofN.J., 356 U.S.
464,467 (1958) (suggesting there are situations where the Fourteenth Amendment would
prevent consecutive prosecutions) (overruled on other grounds); Ashe v. Swenson, 397
U.S. 436, 454 (1970) (noting the "increasingly widespread recognition that the
consolidation in one lawsuit of all issues arising out of a single transaction or occurrence
best promotes justice, economy, and convenience"); see also Cloutier, 286 Or. at 595
(Oregon's statute consolidates "[m]ultiple statutory violations ... in one prosecution, not
merely because they involve evidence common to the time, place and circumstances, but

because the responsibility of the defendant for his conduct in pursuit ofone 'criminal
objective' should be fully determined in one proceeding") (emphasis added).
Utah's statutory bar against multiple prosecutions for single criminal episode
offense, comports with these ideas as it is intended to both "protect a defendant from the
governmental harassment of being subjected to successive trials for offenses stemming
from the same criminal episode," and "to ensure finality without unduly burdening the
judicial process by repetitious litigation." Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, ,r 22 (quotation
omitted); see also Sommerville, 2013 UT App 40, ,r 7 (same); Strader, 902 P.2d at 641
(same)); Rasabout, 2013 UT App 71, ,r 11 (those statutes are "designed to protect a
defendant from multiple trials for offenses that are part of a 'single criminal episode."'
(citation omitted) (aff'd, 2015 UT 72, ,r 11, 356 P.3d 1258)). Indeed, Utah's statutes
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generously protect defendants, by expanding "the scope of offenses barred from multiple
trials beyond the same offense focus in double jeopardy, to all offenses arising from a
single criminal episode."' Rushton, 2015 UT App 170, ,r 10 (quoting Strader, 902 P.2d at
641 ). These notions are intimately tied with due process, as they prevent the state from
being "free to refile criminal charges under all circumstances," as "[c]onsiderations of
fundamental fairness preclude vesting the State with such unbridled discretion." State v.
Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 646-47 (Utah 1986). 10
Under the plain language of Utah Code§ 76-1-401, particularly in light of the
single criminal episode statutes' purpose in preventing multiple prosecutions to ensure
fundamental fairness, Mr. Rushton's conduct was incident to accomplishing a single
criminal objective and the single criminal episode statutes should have protected him
under the facts and circumstances of these cases.
C. The state's evidence demonstrates that Mr. Rushton 's conduct
was all incident to the single criminal objective of
misappropriation.

Mr. Rushton's conduct-his behavior, actions, and inactions-from 2006 through
2009-in failing to pay Fooptube's taxes, retirement fund obligations, and wages-all
arose from a single criminal objective: misappropriation. See MISAPPROPRIATION,
Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) ("misappropriation" is "[t]he application of
another's property or money dishonestly to one's own use"); see also Rushton, 2015 UT

10

Brickey recognizes the due process implications of requiring a defendant to
repeatedly defend against prosecutions, principles that also apply here. See State v.
Morgan, 2001 UT 87, ,r 15, 34 P.3d 767 ("The lodestar of Brickey .. . is fundamental
fairness").
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App 170, il 20 (acknowledging "his criminal objective in each case was to steal money to
which he was not entitled").
That Mr. Rushton's conduct was incident to one criminal objective is clear from
the fact that his conduct occurred entirely within the Fooptube enterprise, where he
controlled and managed the "decisions of who was to be paid and who was not to be
paid," and whether "to delay or not to pay the [retirement] contributions." See R.59,117.
Whether he decided to misappropriate money he should have used to pay Fooptube's
taxes, or Fooptube's employees' wages, or with which he should have remitted their
retirement contributions, he was misappropriating that money. Regardless of how he did
it, Mr. Rushton continuously put money that was not his "dishonestly to one's own use."
MISAPPROPRIATION, Black's, supra. Indeed, his conduct was all under an
overarching scheme, as a series of misappropriations in an extended but single criminal
episode. Cf State v. Bradshaw, 2006 UT 87, il 13, 152 P .3d 288 ("the fact that schemers
may alter slightly their methodology or effect the fraud on various victims at different
times is not conclusive evidence that the separate acts of fraud are separate schemes"
(citing United States v. Pharis, 298 F.3d 228, 234 (3d Cir.2002) (Cowen, J., dissenting)
("By itself, changing the method used to commit a fraud does not inaugurate a new
fraudulent scheme")).
Agent Mann saw Mr. Rushton' s conduct as all being directed to the single
criminal objective of misappropriation. See, e.g., R.83 (Mann alleging in the 2009
prosecution that Mr. Rushton "used and continued to use the improperly/fraudulently
retained/converted funds to further the[] business enterprise as well as for[] personal
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use"); compare R.32 (Mann alleging in the 2011 prosecution that Mr. Rushton "used and
continued to use the improperly/fraudulently retained/converted funds, both funds that
were due and owing as wages and/ or funds that were part of the employees retirement
funds, to further his business enterprise and/or for personal use" in the 2011 prosecution).
Mann also correctly recognized that Mr. Rushton "asserted control over [Fooptube] and
the funds generated from [Fooptube] have been used, at least in part, to help continue
such operation and/or continue the unlawful criminal activity." R.32. Mann made
verbatim allegations in 2009, alleging Mr. Rushton "ran the company," and "asserted
control over [Fooptube] and the funds generated from [Fooptube] have been used, at least
in part, to help continue such operation and/or continue the unlawful criminal activity."
R.83. Agent Mann's assertions can lead to only one conclusion, that he saw Mr.
Rushton's conduct as all incident to the criminal objective of misappropriation.
That there was a continuous timeline of conduct, all within Fooptube, also shows
Mr. Rushton's conduct was motivated by his singular objective. Agent Mann began
investigating Fooptube in 2008, only after the Utah State Tax Commission made "several
attempts," unsuccessfully, to have Mr. Rushton "remit or work toward remitting the
improperly held withholding taxes." R.82. Also in 2008, Fooptube employees began to
report their wages going unpaid in the spring R.252. By January/February of 2009, Mr.
Rushton was under the Department of Labor's injunction to pay Fooptube employees a
tremendous amount in back and continuing wages, even as he was almost entirely
enjoined from shipping products for sale. R.70-75. Under those circumstances, where Mr.
Rushton had to pay those wages any way he could, he misappropriated Fooptube
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retirement contributions. See R.124-131 ( detail of wages paid to employees in 2008 and
2009). Fooptube's employees learned in the summer of 2008, that their "401K
contributions had not been going into our individual plans ... apparently as Dave
[Rushton] tried to continue paying people wages with it instead." R.243.
Then in 2009, the state filed its 2009 prosecution, demanding that Mr. Rushton
pay Fooptube's unpaid taxes, while he was still trying to meet his obligations under the
Amended Consent Injunction.. R.78-84. By that time, Mr. Rushton's misappropriations
had mostly stopped, because the injunction prohibited Fooptube from selling products,
thus there was little income to continue to misappropriate. Yet the state waited until April
of2011 to finally charge Mr. Rushton for the offenses he committed in 2008 and 2009,
even as it knew Mr. Rushton had not only committed tax offenses but also wage and
retirement fund offenses as well from Agent Mann. R.58. The state's own agent saw Mr.
Rushton's conduct as "separate manifestations of [a] single, ongoing criminal objective"
in an "overarching scheme." Mead, 2001 UT 58, if 56. Under these circumstances, and
the single criminal episode statute, it is inexplicable why the state waited to separately
prosecute Mr. Rushton until after he pleaded guilty in the first case, as the single criminal
episode statute protects a defendant "from the governmental harassment of being
subjected to successive trials for offenses stemming from the same criminal episode."

Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, iJ 22. 11

11

The state of Utah, through the same prosecutor, regularly prosecutes multiple
offenses from an extended single criminal episode in a single prosecution. See, e.g., State
v. Steed, 2014 UT 16,325 P.3d 87 (same prosecutor charging: five counts of failure to
file a proper tax return, with one a pattern of unlawful activity count, and four counts of
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Moreover, a single prosecution of Mr. Rushton for all the offenses would have
better "ensure[ d] finality" and kept the state from "unduly burdening the judicial process
by repetitious litigation." Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, iJ 22 (quotation omitted)). Even though
the state charged Mr. Rushton in separate prosecutions with twenty-six interrelated
offenses, nineteen of the charges were brought in the 2011 prosecution alone, and all the
charges shared a single source for facts and witnesses: Fooptube. R. l-6;78-84. Other
evidence to support the state's charges, as Mann made clear, would come from shared
sources and interrelated state agencies. See R.81(Agent Mann listing his sources for the
2011 prosecution as "The Utah State Tax Commission/The Utah Department of
Commerce/The Utah Department of Public Safety/The Utah Department of Workforce
Services/The West Valley City Business License Department/The Utah Labor
Commission/The U.S. Department of Labor"). Further, with a continuous timeline for all
offenses, presenting that single timeline to jurors would have been less confusing in a
single consolidated prosecution. A single prosecution was the more efficient means of
prosecuting Mr. Rushton, and the single criminal episode statute allowed the state to
bring all charges in a single case. See Utah Code§ 76-1-402(1) ("A defendant may be

tax evasion, in a single prosecution of offenses committed over a longer time than in Mr.
Rushton's case); Gibson, 2006 UT App 490 (same prosecutor charging multiple counts
for tax evasion, unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary, communications fraud,
unlawful/ unprofessional conduct, and pattern of unlawful activity, in a single
prosecution for offenses committed over two years); State v. Eyre, 2008 UT 16, 179 P.3d
792 (same prosecutor charging failure to file taxes, tax evasion, failure to obtain a license
to act as a dealer or salesperson of motor vehicles, for offenses that spanned 5 years). The
fact that the state alleged Mr. Rushton committed multiple offenses over years, was
clearly no bar to the state prosecuting Mr. Rushton in a single prosecution.
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prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses arising out of a single
criminal episode").
The state also could have easily amended its 2009 prosecution with the 2011
charges. See Utah R. Crim. Pro. 4 (d) ("The court may permit an information to be
amended at any time before trial has commenced so long as the substantial rights of the
defendant are not prejudiced"). Or the state could have also easily joined its charges in a
single prosecution and Mr. Rushton would have had difficulty arguing the prejudice
necessary to sever them. See Utah Code§ 77-8a-1 (4)(a) (Allowing a court to sever into
separate trials, offenses which, if tried together may prejudice the prosecution or
defense). However, where the state instead proceeded in violation of the single criminal
episode statutes, it was barred from subjecting Mr. Rushton to an additional prosecution
after his guilty plea in the 2009 prosecution. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(1) (when "a
defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out of the
same criminal episode is barred").
When Mr. Rushton's conduct is viewed under the plain language of Utah Code§
76-1-401 and in light of its purpose to expand due process protections and ensure
fundamental fairness, while also prevents inefficiencies, the court of appeals was
incorrect to affirm the trial court's conclusion that the offenses in this case did not arise
from the same "single criminal episode" as those offenses in the 2009 prosecution.
D. The court of appeals erred in interpreting the single criminal
episode statute to require "a narrow, rather than an expansive,
view" of a single criminal episode in Mr. Rushton 's case, as it also
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decided "[a]n expansive interpretation of 'single criminal episode'
is appropriate" in other appeals.

The court of appeals was incorrect to affirm the trial court's ruling, by
"employing a narrow interpretation of single criminal episode" in Mr. Rushton's
case. Rushton, 2015 UT App 170, iJ 13.
Underlying the court of appeals' decision was the trial court's erroneous finding
that "[t]he offenses underlying each case were not incident to the accomplishment of a
single criminal objective as defined by the Statute and related case law because the
offense in each case involved different victims." R.321. The trial court's finding was
incorrect because the plain language of Utah Code§ 76-1-401 is, as noted, concerned
only with the defendant's conduct and whether it was "incident to an attempt or an
accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Utah Code§ 76-1-401. That language
does not direct a court to look at victims or any other consequences of that conduct.
Indeed, under that definition, multiple victims may result from a single criminal
episode. See James, 631 P.2d at 855 (defendant kidnapped five hostages and could be
subjected to five convictions, as "[i]n crimes against the person (as contrasted with
crimes against property), a single criminal act or episode may constitute as many offenses
as there are victims."); id. at 856 ("offenses committed against multiple victims are not
the same, for double jeopardy purposes even though they may arise from the same
criminal episode"); Mane, 783 P.2d at 63-64 (multiple victims did not prevent
defendant's conviction for murder and two counts of aggravated assault where the
underlying "shootings were part of a single criminal episode").
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Similarly, Utah law also punishes, as aggravated murder, a homicide "committed
incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during which two or
more persons were killed." Utah Code§ 76-5-202(1)(b) (emphasis added); see also State
v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah 1987) (two homicides committed during a ninetyminute period part of one criminal episode); State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450,459 (Utah
1994) (finding a single criminal objective shared by a group, which was "to remove two
uninvited guests from [a] residence by means of unlawful and violent force, which could
have, and did, result in the intentional deaths of two persons"); State v. Sousa, 903 So.
2d 923, 924 (Fla. 2005) (defendant shot two victims "in rapid succession during a
single criminal episode"). The trial court's ruling was incorrect.
The court of appeals understood Mr. Rushton's single "criminal objective in
each case was to steal money to which he was not entitled," yet nonetheless it employed a
"narrow interpretation" to reject his claim. Rushton, 2015 UT App 170, ,r,r 20, 21 ("[t]he
narrow label of single criminal objective is not meant to encompass such a broad criminal
goal because if it did, then almost any series of crimes committed for the purpose of
illegally obtaining money, say to feed a drug habit, could be described as 'single"'); but
see Porter, 705 P.2d at 1178 (court of appeals concluding two separate burglaries taking
money from separate buildings were "committed during a single criminal episode"). It
was an incorrect approach to statutory interpretation for the court of appeals to employ a
"narrow" interpretation of "single criminal episode" to reject Mr. Rushton's claims,
especially where it also determined it would apply an "expansive interpretation" of the
same statutory term "single criminal episode," in appeals "when one of the parties
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challenges joinder for trial." Id.

,r 14. The court of appeals' approach is contrary to the

statute's plain language, contrary to our courts' rules of statutory interpretation and
construction, it undermines the legislative purpose of the single criminal episode statute,
and it results in the disparate treatment of litigants.

It is important to note the history of the court of appeals' unique and repeated
approach to statutory interpretation. That court first conjured its narrow/expansive
distinction in Strader, calling it an "interpretive model." 902 P.2d at 641.

12

There, the

defendant, like Mr. Rushton, appealed from a second prosecution for offenses he argued
were in a single criminal episode. See id. at 640 ("the sole issue ... is whether the trial
court erred in refusing to dismiss the charge of possession of a controlled substance,
based on its determination that the charge did not arise from the same criminal episode as
the previously prosecuted charge of giving false identification to a police officer"). The
court of appeals suggested some indifference to Strader's claim under the single criminal
episode statute, stating "Strader's appeal is somewhat atypical. It is not the usual
defendant who clamors for all pending charges against him to be tried together before the
same jury," Id.; see also id. n. 3 ("a cynic might suggest that if the three charges would
have been brought together initially, Strader would have moved to sever, arguing that the
three offenses were completely distinct wrongs and that he would be prejudiced if they
were all tried together"). A majority of the court of appeals held that the offenses did not
share a single criminal objective. Id. at 639, 643.

12

The court of appeals relied heavily on Strader in Rushton, citing it eleven times in
eight sections of the opinion. 2015 UT App 170, ,r,r 9,10,11,12,16,18,20, n.7.
36

To reach that holding, rather than apply the plain language of Utah Code§ 76-1401, the court of appeals looked to other types of cases involving the term "single
criminal episode." Id. at 641. The court decided it had used an "expansive interpretation
of 'single criminal episode' in cases contestingjoinder of multiple offenses," while its
"review of a double jeopardy issue employs a very narrow perspective, focusing on
whether a subsequent prosecution is for the same offense without regard to whether
multiple offenses were part of the same criminal episode." Id. at 642. The court was not
clear in why those cases should affect how it interpreted the single criminal episode
statutes' bar on multiple prosecutions. See id. Nonetheless, it determined "the
circumstances of Strader's claim place this case closer to a double jeopardy analysis than
to ajoinder of offenses analysis." Id. at 643. And therefore, "although our focus must be
on the inherently broader term 'criminal episode,' in the unique posture of defendant's
case we believe it is appropriate to take a narrow, rather than an expansive, view of what
that term entails." Id. The court then concluded, "viewing all of the facts and
circumstances in a narrowly focused way ... there was no common criminal purpose"
and the offenses were not "part of the same criminal episode." Id. at 643.
Judge Davis concurred, specifically writing to criticize the majority's analytical
approach. Id. at 644. He noted their analysis was "not only unnecessary to the result but
analytically flawed." Id. He articulated the flaw in analogizing Strader's case to double
jeopardy when he was "seeking to avail himself of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§
..

76-1-401 to -405 (1990)," and "not claiming that he was 'twice put in jeopardy' within

....;;J

the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Id. Judge Davis
37

also clarified that nothing in the statutory language "suggests an 'expansive'
interpretation where the government is pursuing j oinder or a 'very narrow perspective'
where the defendant is attempting to benefit from the statutory provisions." Id. He
concluded "the majority's application of a double standard for interpreting the definition
of a single criminal episode set out in section 76-1-401 is unnecessarily confusing," and
was not "logically suggested by the statute." Id.
Nonetheless, the court of appeals has continued to apply this "double standard," to
take a narrow view of a single criminal episode when a defendant appeals from a
subsequent prosecution. Id.; see Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, ,r 26 ("where a defendant is
arguing that a subsequent prosecution is barred by a prior conviction, 'it is appropriate to
take a narrow, rather than an expansive, view of what [a single criminal episode]
entails,"' and finding no single criminal episode) (alteration original) (quotation
omitted)); Parkinson, 2014 UT App 140 ("where a defendant is arguing that a subsequent
prosecution is barred by a prior conviction, 'it is appropriate to take a narrow, rather than
an expansive, view of what [a single criminal episode] entails,"' and reversing trial
court's bar on second prosecution) (alterations original) (quotations omitted); Rushton,
2015 UT App 170 (same).This Court has never applied a narrow/expansive interpretation
of the statutory definition of a "single criminal episode." 13

13

See, e.g., Mead, 2001 UT 58; Cornish, 571 P.2d 577; State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d
1206 (Utah 1977); Ririe, 2015 UT 37; Hupp v. Johnson, 606 P.2d 253,254 (Utah 1980);
see also State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203, 208 (Utah 1983) (concluding the offenses for which
the defendant "was prosecuted in the first and second ... prosecutions were closely
related in time and pursuant to a single criminal objective").
38

There are several problems with the court of appeals' bifurcated approach to the
single criminal episode statute. The first problem is that it is an incorrect approach to
statutory interpretation and construction, the central objective of which is to ascertain
legislative intent through the statute's plain language. State v. Harker, 2010 UT 56, il 12,
240 P.3d 780. ("Our primary objective when interpreting statutes is to give effect to the
legislature's intent." (quotations omitted)); Anderson, 2010 UT 47, il 9 (same). The court
of appeals' "narrow" approach finds no support in the statute's plain language, none of
which "suggests an 'expansive' interpretation where the government is pursuingjoinder
or a 'very narrow perspective' where the defendant is attempting to benefit from the
statutory provisions." Strader, 902 P.2d at 644.
Utah Code§ 76-1-401 's language is not at all narrow as it includes "all conduct."
Moreover the statutory bar on multiple prosecution for offenses in a single criminal
episode, was meant to "expand the scope of offenses barred from multiple trials beyond
the same offense focus in double jeopardy, to all offenses arising from a 'single criminal
episode." Strader, 902 P.2d at 641 (quotation omitted); Ririe, 2015 UT 37, at il 6 ("[t]he
single criminal episode statute ... takes the matter a step further" than double jeopardy).
Had the Legislature intended for a narrow interpretation to apply to appeals contesting
multiple prosecutions, it would have said so. See State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 86, il 12, 150
P.3d 540 ("Had that been the Legislature's intent ... it easily could have said so");

Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, il 36 n. l(J. Durrant, concurring) (applying "the presumption ...
that the legislature intends that words be understood in statutes as they are ordinarily
used, unless there are indicia to the contrary" (citing Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch
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P'ship, 2011 UT 50, iJ 14,267 P.3d 863)). The court of appeals' approach incorrectly
imposes an arbitrary meaning to the statute. See Canton, 2013 UT 44, iJ 12 (rejecting an
"abstract construct of' an ordinary legal term, "both as a matter of (a) the ordinary
meaning of statutory language consisting of common, daily, nontechnical speech ....
[A]nd (b) under the possibility that the statute may employ a legal term of art ... with a
settled meaning in the law." (quotation omitted)).
Then, that the Legislature intended for Utah Code§ 76-1-401 to apply in the same
fashion (rather than narrowly in some appeals and expansively in other) is evident from
the fact that it contains the Utah Code's only definition of a "single criminal episode,"
and nine other statutes-across a range of contexts-all reference that single definition. 14
Thus, and contrary to the court of appeals' approach-giving the statutory terms protean
meaning depending on the appeal-the Legislature intended for a single definition to
apply in all appeals involving a single criminal episode including: merger, severance,
joinder, and the bar on multiple prosecutions. Cf. State v. Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, iJ 16, 44
P.3d 730 (noting, "in the context ofjoinder and severance, that murder coupled with
another crime to avoid responsibility for the murder constitutes a "single criminal
14

Those nine provisions are: Utah Code§§ 76-1-402(1) (double jeopardy); 76-1403(1) (bar against multiple prosecutions); 76-5b-203(5)(b) (referencing 76-1-401
(incorrectly) to enhance the penalty for convictions for distributing intimate images); 2319-9(6)(a) (limiting driver's license suspensions to one per single criminal episode); 7732-604(1) & 704(1) (relating to the indigent capital defense trust fund); 78A-5-102(8)(c)
(district court jurisdiction), 78A-6-103(2)(c) Guvenile court jurisdiction). Even the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure reference this singular definition. See Utah R. Crim. Pro.
9.5(1)(a) (requiring "[u]nless otherwise provided by law," that "complaints, citations, or
informations charging multiple offenses ... arisingfrom a single criminal episode as
defined by[§] 76-1-401, shall be filed in a single court that has jurisdiction of the charges
offense with the highest possible penalty of all the offenses charged" (emphasis added)).
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objective" linking the two offenses together (as long as the time element is satisfied)"
(emphasis added)).
The court of appeals' "double standard" approach also embeds a method for
disparate treatment of litigants in its statutory construction. Strader, 902 P.2d at 644. On
one hand, litigants appealing from multiple prosecutions are doomed to "a narrow
interpretation," which will likely result in the court allowing a subsequent prosecution as
the court of appeals will presume the statutes' protections do not apply. Rushton, 2015
UT App 170, ,r 13 (the statutes' "concerns for judicial economy and protection of
defendants simply do not arise when the conduct is not part of a single criminal episode
because the offenses do not share an intertwined factual or legal history that makes
separate prosecutions inefficient or repetitive"). On the other hand, in an appeal involving
severance or joinder decisions made by the state, the prosecution will receive the benefit
of "[a]n expansive view of single criminal episode." Rushton, UT App 170, at ,r 13 (an
"expansive view" serves to "ensure that the joinder requirement does not unduly preclude
prosecution for charges that do not arise out of a single criminal episode").
The court of appeals' approach also represents a stark departure from the principle
that "persons similarly situated should be treated similarly." Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d
661,669 (Utah 1984); see also Utah Const. art. I,§ 24 (stating, "All laws of a general
nature shall have uniform operation."); see also Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d
455, 458 (Utah 1989) {"This Court seeks to construe laws so as to carry out the
legislative intent while avoiding constitutional conflicts").
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A plain language interpretation of Utah Code § 76-1-401, considering the ordinary
meaning of its terms, influenced by its purpose, should result in the dismissal of this
prosecution of Mr. Rushton. The state had ample time and opportunity to subject Mr.
Rushton to a single prosecution for all his offenses. The single criminal episode statute
should have protected Mr. Rushton "from the governmental harassment of being
subjected to successive trials for offenses stemming from the same criminal episode."

Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, 122 ( quotation omitted).
The court of appeals should have dismissed this case under the single criminal
episode statutes.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Rushton's conduct in the 2009 and 2011 offenses was all "incident to ... an
accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Utah Code § 76-1-401. The single
criminal episode statute should have protected Mr. Rushton from having to defend
against the state's multiple prosecutions. The court of appeals was incorrect in its
interpretation of the single criminal episode statute, and wrong to allow this prosecution.
Mr. Rushton respectfully requests that this Court reverse the court of appeals'

Rushton opinion and dismiss this prosecution.
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THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.
DAVID M. RUSHTON,
Defendant and Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20120969-CA
Filed July 9, 2015
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Robin W. Reese
No. 111903029
Joanna E. Landau, Attorney for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes, Ryan D. Tenney, and Mark W. Baer,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE STEPHEN L. ROTH authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES
JAMES Z. DAVIS and J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. concurred.
ROTH, Judge:
David M. Rushton entered a conditional guilty plea to one
misdemeanor and two felony offenses stemming from his failure
to pay employee wages and remit retirement withholdings while
he owned and operated Fooptube, LLC, a computer
programming and design company. He argues that the district
court should have granted his motion to dismiss the charges
because they arose from the same criminal episode as charges to
which he had previously pleaded guilty. We affirm Rushton's
convictions.
<]ll

State v. Rushton
BACKGROUND
<Jl2
In 2008, the Utah State Tax Commission began
investigating Rushton and Fooptube on suspicion of tax evasion.
On April 14, 2009, the State charged Rushton with six tax crimes
alleged to have been committed during calendar years 2006,
2007, and 2008 (the tax case). During the same time period, a
number of Fooptube employees filed claims for unpaid wages
with the Utah Labor Commission. Also at about this time, the
United States Department of Labor's Employee Benefits Security
Administration was investigating whether Rushton had failed to
remit employee retirement contributions. At a review hearing in
the tax case on May 5, 2009, Fooptube employees personally
notified the tax commission investigator and the prosecutor of
the wage claims. Rushton was arraigned in the tax case in
December 2009, and in June 2010, he pleaded guilty to two
charges pursuant to a plea agreement.
<Jl3
On April 20, 2011, the State filed this second case (the
wage case) against Rushton, charging him with two second
degree felony counts of communications fraud; two second
degree felony counts of unlawful dealing with property by a
fiduciary; two second degree felony counts of theft of services or,
alternatively, twelve class A misdemeanor counts of failing to
pay wages; and one second degree felony count of engaging in a
pattern of unlawful activity for his failure to pay his employees
an estimated $1.17 million in wages and his failure to remit an
estimated $1.2 million in withheld retirement funds. Rushton
moved to dismiss, arguing that his convictions in the tax case
barred the State from prosecuting the wage case because the
charges in the wage case were part of the same criminal episode
as the charges in the tax case. The district court denied Rushton's
motion, concluding that the two cases did not arise from a single
criminal episode. The court explained that although the charges
in both cases were "closely related in time," the conduct from
which the respective charges arose was "not in furtherance of the
same criminal objective." The court reasoned that there was not
a single criminal objective because the "victim in the [tax] case is
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the state of Utah" and "[t]he issue is ... tax laws," while the
wage case involves Rushton's alleged "defraud[ing of] his
employees." 1 After the district court denied his motion, Rushton
entered Sery pleas 2 to three counts. He now appeals the district
court's refusal to dismiss the wage case.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

14

Rushton challenges the district court's decision to deny
his motion to dismiss the wage case. "A trial court's decision to
grant or deny a motion to dismiss presents a question of law,
1. In the tax case, Rushton pleaded guilty to one count of failure

to render personal tax returns and one count of engaging in a
pattern of unlawful activity. The State of Utah is the victim of
both of those crimes. Rushton' s failure to pay taxes resulted in
the state being deprived of funds legitimately owed to it. The
pattern of unlawful activity conviction was based in part on
Rushton's failure "to file or truthfully file corporate tax returns
and remit employee withholding taxes" while operating
Fooptube. But, in filing their own tax returns, Fooptube
employees relied on Rushton's representation that the taxes had
been remitted to the state on their behalf. The state therefore
"applied [credits] for the benefit of such employees" in the
amount of "about $585,917.89." Thus, the state shouldered the
loss from the unpaid employee taxes.
In the wage case, the employees are the victims because
they were not paid wages for which they had worked and their
retirement withholdings were never remitted.
2. A guilty plea entered pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), is conditional. It permits a defendant to
reserve the right to appeal an issue raised in the district court,
such as the denial of the motion to dismiss in this case, and then
to withdraw the plea if he or she is successful on appeal. See id.
at 938.
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which we review for correctness." State v. Selzer, 2013 UT App 3,
P.3d 617 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
<JI 14, 294

ANALYSIS
<_IIS
Rushton argues that in denying his motion to dismiss, the
district court wrongly determined that the charges in the wage
case did not arise out of the same criminal episode as the charges
in the tax case. We conclude that the district court correctly
denied Rushton' s motion to dismiss.
<_II6
Multiple charges arise from a single criminal episode if
the conduct underlying the charges "is closely related in time
and is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single
criminal objective." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (LexisNexis
2012). 3 Except under certain circumstances not relevant here,
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode must be
tried together when "(a) [t]he offenses are within the jurisdiction
of a single court; and (b) [t]he offenses are known to the
prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned on
the first information or indictment." Id. § 76-1-402(2). Failure to
comply with this mandate may bar subsequent prosecution for
conduct arising from the same criminal episode:

If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, a
subsequent prosecution for the same or a different
offense arising out of the same criminal episode is
barred if:

3. We refer to the current version of the Utah Code because the
pertinent statutes do not differ substantively from the versions
in effect at the time of the underlying offenses.
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(a) the subsequent prosecution is for an offense
that was or should have been tried under
[section 402(2)] in the former prosecution; and
(b) the former prosecution:
(i)
resulted in acquittal;
(ii)
resulted in conviction;
(iii) was improperly terminated; or
(iv) was terminated by a final order or
judgment for the defendant that has not
been reversed, set aside, or vacated and
that necessarily required a determination
inconsistent with a fact that must be
established to secure conviction in the
subsequent prosecution.

Id. § 76-1-403(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014). "The purpose of such
compulsory joinder is twofold: (1) to protect a defendant from
the governmental harassment of being subjected to successive
trials for offenses stemming from the same criminal episode; and
(2) to ensure finality without unduly burdening the judicial
process by repetitious litigation." Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, <J{ 22
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

<JI7

It is undisputed that the offenses in both the wage case
and the tax case fell within the jurisdiction of the district court
and that conduct supporting the wage case was known to the
prosecuting attorney at the time that Rushton was arraigned on
the tax case. 4 See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(2) (LexisNexis
2012). It is also undisputed that the State's prosecution in the tax
case resulted in a conviction when Rushton entered his guilty
pleas to two counts. See id. § 76-1-403(1)(b)(ii) (LexisNexis Supp.
2014). Thus, the only point of contention here is whether the tax

4. The State conceded the first factor in the district court, and the

court made the latter finding in the face of the State's opposition.
The State, however, "does not contest" the finding on appeal.
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case charges and wage case charges arose out of a "single
criminal episode" because they were closely related in time and
were incident to the attempt or accomplishment of a single
criminal objective. See id.§ 76-1-401 (LexisNexis 2012).
The district court determined that the charges in each case
did not arise from a single criminal episode because, although
they were "closely related in time," the conduct from which the
two sets of charges arose was "not in furtherance of the same
criminal objective" where "the offense[s] in each case involved
different victims." Rushton challenges the court's latter
determination, arguing that the offenses in both cases were
"incident to one criminal purpose, that of misappropriating
corporate money from Fooptube." The State counters that the
court correctly determined that the two sets of charges were not
part of a single criminal episode because they had separate
criminal objectives, that is, the offenses in the tax case were
aimed at taking funds owed to the government while the
offenses in the wage case were aimed at taking funds owed to
the Fooptube employees. 5 The parties rely on a number of cases
in support of their respective positions. Although all of these
cases may help inform our decision, we consider it useful to first
address the differing contexts in which they arose to explain
why some are more useful than others in resolving the particular
single criminal episode question here.
<J[8

5. The State also argues that the charges were not closely related
in time. In doing so, however, the State does not directly
challenge the district court's finding that they were. We do not
specifically address the timing issue, however, other than to
consider it as part of the context in which the crimes took place,
because we affirm on the basis that Rushton did not have a
single criminal objective in engaging in the conduct underlying
each case.
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I. Categorization of Our Precedent
<J:[9
The cases cited by the parties seem to fit primarily into
three categories: (1) cases that address whether a defendant's
conduct could be charged as more than one offense or amounted
to only a single offense, see, e.g., State v. James, 631 P.2d 854 (Utah
1981); State v. Rasabout, 2013 UT App 71, 299 P.3d 625, cert.
granted, 308 P.3d 536 (Utah 2013); State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989); see also State v. Bauer, 792 N.W.2d 825 (Minn.
2011); (2) cases that address whether separate offenses arguably
arising from a single criminal episode must be tried together, see,
e.g., West Valley City v. Parkinson, 2014 UT App 140, 329 P.3d 833;
State v. Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, 294 P.3d 617; State v. Strader, 902
P.2d 638 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); and (3) cases that address
whether separate offenses arguably arising from a single
criminal episode may be tried separately, see, e.g., State v. Mead,
2001 UT 58, 27 P.3d 1115; State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39 (Utah Ct.
App.1990).
<J:[10 The first category of cases addresses the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy. Strader, 902 P.2d at 642.
Double jeopardy prevents "a defendant from being tried more
than once for the same crime." Id. Although the concepts of
single criminal episode and double jeopardy are distinct, the
double jeopardy issue has been addressed within the single
criminal episode framework. This may be because the enactment
of the single criminal episode statutes resulted in an "expan[sion
of] the scope of offenses barred from multiple trials beyond the
same offense focus in double jeopardy, to all offenses arising
from a single criminal episode." Id. at 641 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); State v. Sommerville, 2013 UT App 40,
<J[ 7, 297 P.3d 665 (explaining that the single criminal episode
statutes were primarily "designed to protect a defendant from
multiple trials for offenses that are part of a single criminal
episode" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). In
other words, the single criminal episode statutes seem to extend
the protection against multiple prosecutions encompassed
within the double jeopardy doctrine from single offenses to
separate offenses arising out a single criminal episode. It may be
20120969-CA
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because of this expansion that the single criminal episode
statutes include a provision emphasizing that they are not
intended to undermine double jeopardy protection:
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single
criminal action for all separate offenses arising out
of a single criminal episode; however, when the
same act of a defendant under a single criminal
episode shall establish offenses which may be
punished in different ways under different
provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable
under only one such provision; an acquittal or
conviction and sentence under any such provision
bars a prosecution under any other such provision.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (LexisNexis 2012); see, e.g., Mane,
783 P.2d at 63-65 (using this provision of the single criminal
episode statutes in its analysis of whether there was one or more
crimes committed). In this first category of cases, where the
primary focus is double jeopardy, the courts have taken "a very
narrow perspective, focusing on whether a subsequent
prosecution is for the same offense" as the first prosecution. 6
Strader, 902 P.2d at 642 (emphasis omitted).

6. Though our courts have addressed single criminal episode

concerns in cases raising double jeopardy issues, we are not
convinced that this first category actually provides much
guidance on single criminal episode questions such as the one
presented here because, in the end, double jeopardy is not
concerned with whether multiple offenses arose out of the same
criminal episode but rather with whether particular conduct
constitutes a single offense or multiple offenses. Because
Rushton has relied on cases from this category and at times our
decisions have used a single criminal episode framework as an
analytical tool in the context of a double jeopardy issue, we
include it within our categorization of case precedent.
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'Ill 1 In the second category of cases, the appellate court's focus
is on the compulsory joinder requirement established in Utah
Code section 76-1-402(2); these cases directly address whether
separate offenses arising from a single criminal episode must be
prosecuted together. In these cases, the defendant's conduct
constitutes more than one prosecutable offense and the issue is
whether the offenses arose from a single criminal episode so as
to bar separate prosecutions in the interest of judicial economy
and finality for the defendant. See, e.g., Selzer, 2013 UT App 3,
<JI 22. We have concluded that this type of claim is "comparable
to asserting double jeopardy." Strader, 902 P.2d at 642. Thus, '"it
is appropriate to take a narrow, rather than an expansive, view
of what [a single criminal episode] entails."' Selzer, 2013 UT App
3, <J{ 26 (alteration in original) (quoting Strader, 902 P.2d at 642).
<jll2 Finally, in the third category of cases, appellate courts are
concerned with whether the mandatory joinder of multiple
charges in a single prosecution deprives one or both parties of a
fair trial. See, e.g., Lopez, 789 P.2d at 42 (noting that severance is
available if trying charges together would prejudice either the
prosecution or the defense). Consequently, there are two related
issues that arise in these cases. The first is whether the offenses
occurred as part of a single criminal episode so that they should
ordinarily be tried together, and the second, which arises only if
they did, is whether trying the charges together in the particular
case would result in undue prejudice to either party. Strader, 902
P.2d at 641 n.6. In this context then, "[ a]n expansive
interpretation of 'single criminal episode' is appropriate." Id. at
641.
<j{13 There are sound reasons for employing a narrow
interpretation of single criminal episode in the first two
categories while using a more expansive interpretation in the
third category. The single criminal episode statutes serve to
"expand the scope of offenses barred from multiple trials
beyond the same offense focus in double jeopardy to all offenses
arising from a single criminal episode." Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). In doing this, the legislature sought to
promote judicial economy and to protect defendants by
20120969-CA
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requiring joinder into a single trial any charges arising from
conduct that was close in time and done in furtherance of the
same criminal objective. Id.; accord Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, <j{ 22.
But these same concerns for judicial economy and protection of
defendants simply do not arise when the conduct is not part of a
single criminal episode because the offenses do not share an
intertwined factual or legal history that makes separate
prosecutions inefficient or repetitive. A narrow perspective thus
serves to ensure that the joinder requirement does not unduly
preclude prosecution for charges that do not arise out of a single
criminal episode.
<JI:14 On the other hand, when one of the parties challenges
joinder for trial, that party is concerned about the prejudice that
may inure to the party's position if the charges are heard
together. An expansive view of single criminal episode allows
the trial court to more readily balance the interest in judicial
economy that the joinder requirement serves with the
defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial and the State's
interest in a fair prosecution. See State v. Strader, 902 P.2d 638, 641
n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Moreover, "because appellate courts
review decisions regarding joinder or severance of offenses only
for abuse of discretion, it follows that the reviewing court would,
as a practical matter, take a broad view of what constitutes a
single criminal episode in that context." Id. at 641-42 (citations
omitted).
115 Given the question before us in this case-whether the tax
offenses and wage offenses all arise from a single criminal
episode so as to bar the prosecution in the wage case-cases in
the second category are the most useful because they are directly
on point. The first category of cases provides only limited
guidance because although the cases use the same narrow
standard for determining whether conduct arises from a single
criminal episode, they are more directly focused on the double
jeopardy-related question of whether the conduct constitutes a
single offense or can legitimately be prosecuted as different
offenses. Here, there is no dispute that Rushton's conduct
constituted more than one offense that could be punished under
20120969-CA
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multiple code prov1s1ons. The severance-related cases in the
third category are even less instructive as they employ a much
broader standard for assessing whether offenses arise from the
same criminal episode because the focus is on prejudice at trial. 7
We therefore rely primarily on the second category of cases in
assessing whether Rushton' s charges arose from a single
criminal episode so as to warrant compulsory joinder.
II. Single Criminal Objective
'il16 The only issue before us in assessing whether the tax case
and the wage case arose from a single criminal episode is
whether the conduct underlying those charges was "incident to

7. While no prior case appears to have explicitly categorized the
existing case law as we have done here, Utah appellate courts
have long utilized these categories in analyzing the questions
that arise under the single criminal episode statutes. See West
Valley City v. Parkinson, 2014 UT App 140, <JI<JI 6-8, 329 P.3d 833
(relying on multiple-prosecution cases to determine whether a
separate crime arose out of the same criminal episode as an
earlier prosecuted offense so as to bar a subsequent prosecution);
State v. Strader, 902 P.2d 638, 642 n.7 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
(observing that the defendant's reliance on severance cases was
unpersuasive where the question presented for appeal involved
whether multiple prosecutions were appropriate); id. at 642 n.5
(noting that "cases considering whether offenses are separate for
double jeopardy purposes are not applicable in single criminal
episode cases contesting the court's decision to join offenses"
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Lopez,
789 P.2d 39, 44 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (stating that "the line of
cases relied upon by defendant to establish that the present
circumstances were not part of a single criminal episode are not
applicable because they do not deal with the issues of joinder
and severance of charges, but with determining if criminal acts
are separate for double jeopardy purposes").
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an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (LexisNexis 2012). "Whether or not
there is a single criminal objective 'depends on the specific facts
of the case viewed under ... the totality of the circumstances."'
State v. Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, <Jr 26, 294 P.3d 617 (omission in
original) (quoting Strader, 902 P.2d at 642). In assessing the
circumstances, a court must "focus[] more on a defendant's
actions," and not on external factors that may link the charges
together, to determine whether "objectively" the conduct is
"incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single
criminal objective." West Valley City v. Parkinson, 2014 UT App
140, <Jr 7, 329 P.3d 833 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
<j{17 In applying the definition of single criminal episode, case
law within the second category suggests that a recurring concern
is whether the commission of one crime is aimed at furthering
the accomplishment of the other crime. For example, in West
Valley City v. Parkinson, 2014 UT App 140, 329 P.3d 833, police
responded to a call of domestic violence to find that the
defendant was no longer at the home. Id. <JI 2. While one officer
was interviewing the victim, the officer saw the defendant drive
by the house. Id. Based on his interview with the victim, the
officer believed that the defendant had a child in the car, and he
therefore attempted to stop the vehicle through hand gestures
and verbal commands. Id. The defendant failed to stop, and
the officer pursued by vehicle, eventually apprehending the
defendant. Id. After being charged with four misdemeanor
domestic violence charges in justice court, the defendant pleaded
guilty to misdemeanor domestic violence assault. Id. <JI 3. About
one week after the defendant's guilty plea, the City filed an
information in district court charging the defendant with crimes
related to the police chase. Id. <jl 4. On the defendant's motion,
the district court concluded that the new charges were part of
the same criminal episode as the domestic violence charges and
dismissed them. Id. The City appealed, and we reversed,
concluding that "the domestic violence charges filed with the
justice court and the conduct for which charges were filed in
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the district court did not share a common criminal objective." Id.
<JI 7. We reasoned that, viewing the circumstances in an objective
manner and with a narrow view of "single criminal episode,"
the defendant's actions in leaving the scene once the police had
been called were "not incident to the accomplishment of his
domestic violence objectives/' which were to "harm[] or
frighten[]" the victim, but rather were "motivated by [the
defendant]'s objective of eluding police." Id. c_[ 9.
<_!I18 Likewise, in State v. Strader, 902 P.2d 638 (Utah Ct. App.
1995), we concluded that the defendant's actions in stealing a
circular saw, providing false identification, and possessing drugs
did not have a single criminal objective. Id. at 639, 643. There, an
officer pulled over the defendant's vehicle after the officer saw
the defendant enter a construction site and return to his car
carrying an object. Id. at 639. When asked for identification, the
defendant gave his correct name but provided the officer with a
clearly altered license that had a false name on it. Id. The officer
arrested the defendant for false identification and, in a search
incident to impounding the car, discovered methamphetamine
as well as the object (a stolen circular saw) that the officer had
seen the defendant carrying from the construction site. Id. The
defendant pleaded guilty to the false identification charge. Id. at
640. Later that month, the State filed charges for all three
offenses: theft, false identification, and possession of a controlled
substance. Id. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the
conduct arose from a single criminal episode for which he had
already been prosecuted. Id. The district court denied the
defendant's motion, except as to the false identification charge to
which the defendant had already pleaded guilty. Id. The
defendant then entered a plea agreement under which he would
plead guilty to the possession charge in exchange for the
dismissal of the theft charge and the right to appeal the denial of
the motion to dismiss. Id.
<j[19 On appeal, we affirmed the district court's denial of the
motion to dismiss. Id. at 643-44. Again taking a narrow view of
what constituted a single criminal episode, we reasoned that the
"only possible nexus between the crimes was [the defendant's]
20120969-CA
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intent to avoid arrest on the [theft and possession] charges by
giving false identification." Id. Yet the defendant's provision of
"a forged driver's license [that he had] at hand seem[ed] to
indicate that obscuring his identity was an ongoing and routine
course of conduct" and was "not specifically done to somehow
further his theft or drug possession activities." Id.; see also Selzer,
2013 UT App 3, ci[<j[ 3-5, 26 (concluding that a sexual assault
followed by a physical assault on the same victim nearly three
hours later did not share a criminal objective because the acts
were conducted for "very different purpose[s]" in that the
physical assault, which was an act of "rage," did not further
the defendant's purpose in committing the earlier sexual assault,
which was done to fulfill the defendant's desire for "sexual
gratification and domination of the victim in a sexual act"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
'II20 Considering the totality of the circumstances of this case,
we conclude that as in Parkinson and Strader, Rushton's actions
in the wage case and the tax case were not incident to the
accomplishment of a single criminal objective. Rather, the crimes
in each case are entirely separate. In the tax case, Rushton's
actions involved taking funds owed to the government by failing
to pay taxes and falsifying withholding-tax statements and W-2s,
while in the wage case, he took funds owed to employees when he
failed to pay earned wages and to remit withheld retirement
savings to the designated retirement funds. And although
Rushton contends that the activities underlying each case had
the common purpose of keeping Fooptube afloat, keeping a
company financially stable is a lawful objective, not a criminal
one. Rather, his criminal objective in each case was to steal
money to which he was not entitled.
<fi21 Moreover, Rushton' s actions in stealing from employees
did not further his objective of stealing from the government,
even if it did advance his ultimate goal of keeping Fooptube
financially viable. And Rushton' s argument that the crimes were
linked by his ultimate goal of unlawfully appropriating the
money of others views his "objective" from too elevated a
vantage point. The narrow label of single criminal objective is
20120969-CA
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not meant to encompass such a broad criminal goal because if it
did, then almost any series of crimes committed for the purpose
of illegally obtaining money, say to feed a drug habit, could be
described as "single." 8 Rather, the fact that the thefts ultimately
benefitted the same company is merely an external factor that
provides some link between the offenses, but it does not
appropriately "focus[] more on the defendant's actions" or his
purpose in committing the acts. 9 See Parkinson, 2014 UT App 140,

17.
8. Indeed, from this viewpoint, a defendant's entering an
apartment building first to steal dimes from its laundry room
and then to steal money or other items of value from an
apartment unit ought to meet the single criminal objective
requirement. See State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1176-78 (Utah
1985). Yet, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that these
activities constituted two separate burglary offenses despite the
defendant's apparent common objective of stealing as much as
possible from a single building. Id. at 1178 (considering whether
the defendant could be prosecuted for more than one crime for
activities arising out a single criminal episode); cf State v. Bauer,
792 N.W.2d 825, 830 (Minn. 2011) (explaining, in the context of
determining that the State's decision to charge the defendant
with both the sale of a controlled substance and failure to affix
tax stamps to a controlled substance did not punish the same
conduct twice, that "the criminal plan of obtaining as much
money as possible is too broad an objective to constitute a single
criminal goal" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
9. That conclusion is underscored by the fact that Rushton's
actions in stealing from the government and stealing from the
employees, though characterized by the district court as
occurring "close in time" due to the overlap in their commission,
also had some temporal distinctions. Rushton falsified tax
documents and failed to pay taxes from 2006 until June 2008,
which was about the time that the state tax commission began
(continued... )
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122 We are unpersuaded by Rushton's other arguments for
treating the wage case and the tax case as having the same
criminal objective. For instance, Rushton argues that less
emphasis should be placed on the number of victims because
even when there are multiple victims, the underlying actions can
still arise from a single criminal episode. In support of his
position, Rushton cites several cases where the defendant was
tried on multiple charges resulting from his actions toward
multiple victims.
123 The cases Rushton relies on, which fall into category one,
do not support his contention. In the cited cases, the defendants
had already been prosecuted (in one trial) for multiple offenses
and were appealing on the basis that the convictions constituted
multiple punishments for the same conduct. Thus, the analysis
on appeal focused on whether the defendant was properly
convicted for multiple offenses, not on the issue presented
here-whether the defendant's actions against multiple victims
were aimed at the accomplishment of a single criminal objective
so as to mandate their prosecution together. For example, in
State v. James, 631 P.2d 854 (Utah 1981), the defendant was
convicted on five counts of aggravated kidnapping for taking
five people hostage during a drugstore robbery. Id. at 855. On
appeal, the defendant argued that "his actions constituted a

( ... continued)
investigating him on suspicion of tax evasion. Although Rushton
also stopped paying employees their wages and remitting their
retirement withholdings sometime in 2008, that conduct
continued through 2009, well after Rushton had ceased his taxrelated crimes. That Rushton stopped his tax scheme and turned
to stealing money owed to his employees around that same time
supports a determination that these two sets of criminal
activities were not part of a single criminal objective but rather
were two separate illegal means for achieving the ultimate goal
of keeping the business afloat.
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single criminal act, hence his constitutional right to not be twice
placed in jeopardy for the same offense was violated." Id. The
Utah Supreme Court concluded that double jeopardy did not
preclude multiple convictions because "offenses committed
against multiple victims are not the same." Id. at 856; see also
State v. Rasabout, 2013 UT App 71, <Jl<JI 10, 12, 33, 299 P.3d 625
(stating, in the course of reversing the trial court's merger of
twelve discharge of a firearm convictions, that whether the
charges arose out of a single criminal episode "does not resolve
the question" because the issue presented in the case "was one of
multiplicity and double jeopardy"), cert. granted, 308 P.3d 536
(Utah 2013); State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(addressing "whether a single criminal act resulting in multiple
victims constitutes a single offense or multiple offenses").
<J{24 In short, Rushton has not shown that the district court
erred in deciding as it did. See State v. Selzer, 2013 UT App 3,
<J[ 27, 294 P.3d 617 (affirming the district court's denial of a
motion to dismiss because although "other possible
interpretations of [the defendant's] actions may be possible, the
district court could certainly have accepted the State's argument
and determined that the sexual assaults and [the physical]
assault did not share a single criminal objective"); cf State v.
Ireland, 570 P.2d 1206, 1207 (Utah 1977) (concluding that
although the defendant made a plausible argument that "all [his]
acts were directed toward escape," "the facts adequately
support[ed] the trial court's determination that two separate and
distinct offenses were committed").
<J[25 For these reasons, we affirm the district court's
determination that Rushton' s actions in the wage case were not
incident to or in furtherance of his purpose in the tax case
because the two sets of charges did not share a single criminal
objective. Accordingly, the district court correctly denied
Rushton' s motion to dismiss.
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CONCLUSION

126 We conclude that there was a basis for the district court's
decision that the actions underlying the wage case were not
incident to the accomplishment of the criminal objective in the
tax case. Consequently, the two sets of charges could properly be
prosecuted in two separate actions and denial of the motion to
dismiss was correct. We therefore affirm Rushton's convictions.
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STATE OF UTAH,

Respondent,

ORDER

v.
Appellate Case No. 20150737-SC
DAVID M. RUSHTON,

Petitioner.

This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, filed on
September 8, 2015.

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari is granted as to the following issue:
Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's
conclusion that the crimes for which Petitioner was prosecuted in this
case did not arise from the same "single criminal episode" as the
crimes prosecuted in a prior case that resulted in a guilty plea.
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant to Rule 2 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Court suspends the provision of Rule 26(a) that
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to submit their briefs on the
merits. The parties shall not be permitted to stipulate to an extension.
Additionally, absent extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted
by motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon its issuance.
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DARIN B. GOFF (Bar No. 11355)
BRET W. RAWSON (Bar No. 11083)
NATE N. NELSON (Bar No. 13307)

MUMFORD RAWSON, LLC
15 W. South Temple, Ste. 1000
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 428-2000
Fax: (801) 662-0082
Email: dgoff@mumfordrawson.com

Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISCTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
V.

DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
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DAVID M. RUSHTON,
Case No. 111903029

Judge Robin W. Reese
Defendant.

A hearing was held on May 3, 2012, on defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the above-cited
matter which motion was denied at that time. Based upon the pleadings entered, arguments of
counsel and good cause appearing, the court hereby enters the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
I.

David Rushton ("Rushton"), a resident of the State of Utah, owned and operated a

company called Fooptube, LLC ("Fooptube" or the "company").
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Q
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2.

The State filed an Information in Case No. 09190370 (hereinafter the "Tax Case")

on April 14, 2009.
3.

In the Tax Case, defendant David Rushton was charged with Failure to render

Proper Tax Returns, Tax Evasion, Unlawful Dealing of Property by a Fiduciary,
Communications Fraud, Failure to Render Proper Tax Returns, and Engaging in a Pattern of
Criminal Activity.
4.

The charges in the Tax Case Information related to events occurring in the years

i

2005, 2006, and 2008 and concerned both personal and business taxes and allegations of crimes

f:

with respect thereto, and the sole victim in the Tax Case is the State of Utah.

5.

I

The defendant was arraigned on the charges in the Tax Case on December 14,

I

2009. entering a guilty plea on all counts.
6.

t

I

The prosecution knew of the offense charged in the Wage and Benefit case prior

to December 14, 2009.

\
t.

7.

The latter charges (which comprise the present "Wage and Benefit Case")

f
E

involved only private individuals as alJeged victims and involve calendar years 2008 and 2009.
8.

The defendant entered a Change of Plea in the Tax Case on June 24, 2010.

9.

At that time, the defendant entered guilty pleas to Charges 5 and 6 (Failure to

Render Proper Personal Income Tax Returns and Engaging in a Pattern of Criminal Activity).
10.

The remainder of the charges--Counts I to 4--were dismissed.

11.

Subsequent to the completion of its investigation, the State filed an Information in

the present case (the Wage and Benefit Case) on April 20, 2011.
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12.

The Wage and Benefit charges defendant David Rusht5on with two counts of

Communication Fraud, two counts of Unlawful Dealing of Property by a Fiduciary, 13 counts of
Failure to Pay Wages or Advising New Employees of Unpaid Wages, and one count of Engaging
:)\

"'51

in a Pattern of Criminal Activity.
13.

The charges in the Wage and Benefit Case Information related to events occurring

in the years 2008 and 2009.
14.

The defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss ("Motion") claiming that the Single

Criminal Episode doctrine, as embodied in Utah Code Section 76-1-401 et seq., prevented
prosecution of the offenses enumerated in the Wage and Benefit Case.
15.

The defendant in his Motion argued for dismissal under the Single Criminal

Episode statute, claiming inter alia, that the State could not meet the four-factor test described in
State v. Sommerville, 248 P.3d 50, 52 (Ut. Ct.App. 2010) to avoid dismissal.
16.

A hearing was held on May 3, 2012, on defendant's Motion.

17.

The defendant's Motion was denied at that time.

I
f:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I.

The defendant's Motion is governed by the Single Criminal Episode doctrine as

enumerated in§ 76-1-401 et seq., which is further explained and governed by the four-factor test
described in State v. Sommerville, 248 P.3d 50, 52 (Ut. Ct.App. 2010).
2.

The State conceded, as a matter of law, element (2) of the Sommerville test,

acknowledging defendant's prior conviction in his initial prosecution (the Tax Case) .
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3.

The State conceded, as a matter of law, element (3) of the Sommerville test,

I

acknowledging the Court's jurisdiction over both the Tax Case and the Wage and Benefit Case.
4.

I

The Court held that the defendant's appearance on December 14, 2009, to enter

his not guilty plea to charges in the Tax Case constituted his arraignment in the Tax Case for

I:

purposes of the Single Criminal Episode doctrine.
5.

G

The Court concluded that because the State become aware of the allegations of

the Wage and Benefit Case no later than May 5, 2009, which was prior to the defendant's
December 14, 2009, arraignment in the Tax Case, the defendant, as a matter of law, satisfied
element (4) of the Sommerville test.
6.

The Court held that the events underlying both cases were sufficiently close in

7.

The Court held that the offenses underlying each case were not incident to the

r\i,J

time.

accomplishment of a single criminal objective as defined by the Single Criminal Episode Statute
and related case law because the offense in each case involved different victims.

8.

Wee the two cases charged in a single matter, presenting the full evidence and

corresponding jury instructions encompassed by such a matter would confuse a jury and such
confusion would not serve the interests ofjustice and fairness.
9.

As the Court held that the offenses were not incident to the accomplishment of a

single criminal objective, therefore, the defendant has failed to satisfy the second prong of
element ( 1) under the State v. Sommerville test for the Single Criminal Episode Statute.

f
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10.

The defendant's motion fails as a matter of law for law of satisfying the

I

aforementioned element (1) of the Sommerville test.

ORDER
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pursuant to the
Ruling of this Court dated 03 May 2012, defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
DATED this

3 ( day of

()

Cf

2012.
BY THE COURT:

District Court
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

!

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this (l~ day of October 2012, I caused to be served a
true an correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS by the method indicated below, to the following:
Mark Baer
Assistant Attorney General
160 E. 300 S.
Salt Lake City. UT 84 I I 4

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Email
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76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined -- Joinder of offenses and defendants.
76-1-401

In this part unless the context requires a different definition, "single criminal episode"
means all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an
accomplishment of a single criminal objective.
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify the effect of Section 77-8a-1
in controlling the joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal proceedings.

Amended by Chapter 20, 1995 General Session

76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode -- Included
offenses.
76-1-402
(I)
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under
a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different
ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one
such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a
prosecution under any other such provision.
(2)
Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be
subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
[',

(a)

The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and

~

(b)
The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is
arraigned on the first infonnation or indictment.
(3)
A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but
may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An offense is
so included when:
(a)
It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish
the commission of the offense charged; or
(b)
It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit
the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c)

It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.

(4)
The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included
offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense
charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5)
If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on
appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a
conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a
conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact
required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction

rw

may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for the included
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.

Amended by Chapter 32, 1974 General Session
@

@
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76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution for offense
out of same episode.
76-1-403
(I)
If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out of a single
criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out
of the same criminal episode is barred if:
(a)
the subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should have been
tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and
(b)

the former prosecution:
(i)

resulted in acquittal;

(ii)

resulted in conviction;

(iii)

was improperly terminated; or

(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant that
has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily required a
determination inconsistent with a fact that must be established to secure
conviction in the subsequent prosecution.
(2)
There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty by the
trier of facts or in a determination that there was insufficient evidence to warrant
conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of the greater
offense even though the conviction for the lesser included offense is subsequently
reversed, set aside, or vacated.
(3)
There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt that has not
been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not been reversed, set
aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a judgment; or a plea of guilty
accepted by the court.
(4)
There is an improper termination of prosecution if the termination takes place
before the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and takes place after a
jury has been impaneled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury trial is waived,
after the first witness is sworn. However, termination of prosecution is not improper if:
(a)

the defendant consents to the tennination;

(b)

the defendant waives his right to object to the termination; or

:~

(c)
the court finds and states for the record that the termination is necessary
because:
(i)
it is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity
with the law;
(ii)
there is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the state
that would make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter
of law;
(iii) prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable to the
state makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to the
defendant or the state;
(iv)

the jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or

(v)

false statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial.

Amended by Chapter 278, 2013 General Session
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

By: MARK BAER #5440
Assistant Attorney General
MARK SHURTLEFF #4666
Attorney General
Attorney For The State of Utah
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Ph: (801) 366-0199

SALT LAKE COUNlY,.
By _ _ _ _ _____,:«R'~~~
Deputy Clerf<

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AMENDED
INFORMATION

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID M. RUSHTON
DOB:
Defendants.

Criminal No. 111903029

The undersigned.SCOTT MANN, states on information and belief that the defendant
committed the crime(s) of:
COUNTl
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, (Employment Agreement) a Second Degree Felony, in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about calendar year 2008 in violation of Utah Code Title 76
Chapter 10 Section 1801 and Title 76 Chapter 2 Section 202 defendant, DAVID M. RUSHTON,
as a party to the offense, did devise a scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain money,
property, or anything of value from another by false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
promises, or material omissions, and communicated directly or indirectly with any person by any
means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice and the value of the
property defrauded or obtained was or exceeded $5,000.00; to witt the defendant devised a
scheme or artifice to obtain or defraud money from the defendants' employee compensation
and/or retirement arrangements via false pretenses, representations, promises or omissions and
did communicate such false promises or false or fraudulent pretenses with said employees.
COUNT2

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD (Employment Agreement), a Second Degree Felony, in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about calendar year 2009 in violation of Utah Code Title 76

*'
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Chapter IO Section 180 I and Title 76 Chapter 2 Section 202 defendant, DAVID M. RUSHTON,
as a party to the offense, did devise a scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain money,
property, or anything of value from another by false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
promises, or material omissions, and communicated directly or indirectly with any person by any
means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice and the value of the
property defrauded or obtained was or exceeded $5,000.00; to wit, the defendant devised a
scheme or artifice to obtain or defraud money from the defendants' employee compensation
and/or retirement arrangements via false pretenses, representations, promises or omissions and
\\._did communicate such false promises or false or fraudulent pretenses with said employees.

~i

COUNT3
0
\ UNLAWFUL DEALING OF PROPERTY BY A FIDUCIARY (Employees Compensation), ;
,/
/\- a Second Degree Felony, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during calendar year 2008, in
,t;( 1~"'/
violation of Utah Code Title 76 Chapter 6 Section 513, the defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as r
·
a party to the offense, did deal with property that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary, in a
manner which he knew was a violation of his duty and which involved substantial risk of loss or
detriment to the owner(s) or to a person(s) for whose benefit the property was entrusted, and the
value of the property was or exceeded $5,000.00; to wit, the defendant as a fiduciary for his
company did obtain and deal with employee wages and/or retirement funds in excess of
$5,000.00 which had been entrusted to him and did fail to remit the same.
COUNT4

UNLAWFUL DEALING OF PROPERTY BY A FIDUCIARY (Employees Compensation),
a Second Degree Felony, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during calendar year 2009, in
violation of Utah Code Title 76 Chapter 6 Section 513, the defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as
a party to the offense, did deal with property that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary, in a
manner which he knew was a violation of his duty and which involved substantial risk of loss or
detriment to the owner(s) or to a person(s) for whose benefit the property was entrusted, and the
value of the property was or exceeded $5,000.00; to wit, the defendant as a fiduciary for his
company did obtain and deal with employee wages and/or retirement funds in excess of
$5,000.00 which had been entrusted to him and did fail to remit the same.

COUNTS
THEFT OF SERVICES (Employees Work), a Second Degree Felony, in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, during calendar year 2008, in violation of Utah Code Title 76 Chapter 6 Section
409, the defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the owner/manager/operator of Fooptube, LLC,
did obtain services which he knew were available ~nly for compensation by deception, threat,
force, or any other means designed to avoid the due payment for them; to wit, the defendant
obtained the use/benefit of the services up to 95 or more employees without the benefit of
compensating said employees for their services, and the services were valued in excess of
$5,000.00.
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COUNT6

THEFT OF SERVICES (Employees Work), a Second Degree Felony, in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, during calendar year 2009, in violation of Utah Code Title 76 Chapter 6 Section
409, the defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the owner/manager/operator of Fooptube, LLC,
did obtain services which he knew were available only for compensation by deception, threat,
force, or any other means designed to avoid the due payment for them; to wit, the defendant
obtained the use/benefit of the services up to 95 or more employees without the benefit of
compensating said employees for their services, and the services were valued in excess of
$5,000.00.
In the Alternative to Counts 5 & 6 Only - Counts 7-19 Below:

COUNT7

FAILURE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NEW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES,
a Class A Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during October 2008, in violation of
Utah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the
owner/manager/employer ofFooptube, LLC, did refuse to pay wages to his employees which
were due and payable, or with an intent to secure for himself or any other person any discount
upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of
every wage claim due and unpaid.
COUNTS
FAILURE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NEW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES,
a Class A Misdemeanor, in.Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during November 2008, in violation
of Utah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the
owner/manager/employer of Fooptube, LLC, did refuse to pay wages to his employees which
were due and payable, or with an intent to secure for himself or any other person any discount
upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of
every wage claim due and unpaid.
-~

COUNT9
FAILURE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NEW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES,
A Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during December 2008, in violation
ofUtah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the
owner/manager/employer ofFooptube, LLC, did refuse to pay wages to his employees which
were due and payable, or with an intent to secure for himself or any other person any discount
upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of
every wage claim due and unpaid.
a Class
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COUNT 10

FAILURE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NEW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES,
a Class A Misdemeanor, in Sa1t Lake County, State of Utah, during January 2009, in violation of
Utah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the
owner/manager/employer ofFooptube, LLC, did refuse to pay wages to his employees which
were due and payable, or with an intent to secure for himself or any other person any discount
upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of
every wage claim due and unpaid.
COUNT 11
FAILURE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NEW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES,
a Class A Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during February 2009, in violation
of Utah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the
owner/manager/employer ofFooptube, LLC, did refuse to pay wages to his employees which
were due and payable, or with an intent to secure for himself or any other person any discount
upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of
every wage claim due and unpaid.
COUNT12
FAILURE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NEW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES,

a Class A Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during March 2009, in violation of
Utah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the
owner/manager/employer ofFooptube, LLC, did refuse to pay wages to his employees which
were due and payable, or with an intent to secure for himself or any other person any discount
upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of
every wage claim due and unpaid.
COUNT 13

FAILURE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NEW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES,
a Class A Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during April 2009, in violation of
Utah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the
owner/manager/employer ofFooptube, LLC, did refuse to pay wages to his employees which
were due and payable, or with an intent to secure for himself or any other person any discount
upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of
every wage claim due and unpaid.
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COUNT 14

FAILURE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NEW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES,
a Class A Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during May 2009, in violation of
Utah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the
owner/manager/employer of Fooptube, LLC, did refuse to pay wages to his employees which
were due and payable, or with an intent to secure for himself or any other person any discount
upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of
every wage claim due and unpaid.
COUNTIS

FAILURE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NEW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES,
a Class A Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during June 2009, in violation of
Utah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the
owner/manager/employer ofFooptube, LLC, did refuse to pay wages to his employees which
were due and payable, or with an intent to secure for himself or any other person any discount
upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of
every wage claim due and unpaid.
COUNT 16
FAILURE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NEW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES,
a Class A Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during July 2009, in violation of
Utah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the
owner/manager/employer ofFooptube, LLC, did refuse to pay wages to his employees which
were due and payable, or with an intent to secure for himself or any other person any discount
upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of
every wage claim due and unpaid.
COUNT 17
FAILURE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NEW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES,
a Class A Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during August 2009, in violation of
Utah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the
owner/manager/employer of Fooptube, LLC, did refuse to pay wages to his employees which
were due and payable, or with an intent to secure for himself or any other person any discount
upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of
every wage claim due and unpaid.
COUNT 18
FAILURE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NEW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES,
a Class A Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during September 2009, in violation
5
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of Utah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the
owner/manager/employer of Fooptube, LLC, did refuse to pay wages to his employees which
were due and payable, or with an intent to secure for himself or any other person any discount
upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of
every wage claim due and unpaid.
COUNT 19
FAILURE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NEW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES,
a Class A Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during October 2009, in violation
of Utah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the
owner/manager/employer ofFooptube, LLC, did refuse to pay wages to his employees which
were due and payable, or with an intent to secure for himself or any other person any discount
upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of
every wage claim due and unpaid.
·
COUNT20
ENGAGING IN A PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY, a SECOND DEGREE
FELONY, a Second Degree Felony, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah on or about years 2008
and 2009, in violation of Utah Code Title 76 Chapter 10 Section 1603, concerning the
establishment known as Fooptube LLC, located in or doing business in Salt Lake County, in that
the defendant DA YID M. RUSHTON as a party to the offense:
(1) received proceeds derived, either directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful
activity in which the defendant participated as a principal, and then used or invested, directly or

indirectly, any part of that income, or the proceeds of the income, or the proceeds derived from
the investment or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment
or operation of, any enterprise; or
(3) was employed by or associated with the enterprise, and did conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of that enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful
activity.
Notice of Predicate Offenses:

For purposes of establishing defendant's pattern of unlawful activity, the State of Utah
asserts that defendant, DAVID M. RUSHTON, has engaged in conduct, which constitutes the
commission of at least three episodes of unlawful activity, which conduct is alleged as follows:
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, two (2) Second Degree Felony offenses, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, for years 2008 and 2009, in violation of Utah Code §76-10-1801.
UNLAWFUL DEALING BY A FIDUCIARY, two (2) Second Degree offenses, in Sa1t
6
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Lake Count, State of Utah, for the calendar years 2008 and 2009 inclusive, in violation of Utah
Code §76-6-513.

THEFT OF SERVICES, two (2) Second Degree Felony offenses, in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, for years 2008 and 2009 inclusive, in violation of Utah Code §76-6-409.
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM AN
INVESTIGATION WHICH INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES OR
EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES:
1.

2.

·-.;i)

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Scott Mann, Utah State Tax Commission (USTC) Special Agent.
Negyssue A. Abraha, Agent, U.S. Dept of Labor Employee Benefits Security
Administration.
Ronald Ludlow, Utah Labor Commission.
Keeper of the Records, Utah Labor Commission.
Keeper of the Records, Utah Department of Commerce.
Keeper of Records, Utah Department of Public Safety.
Keeper of the Records, Utah Department of Workforce Services.
Various employees/former employees ofFooptube LLC.

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT
Affiant, under oath, bases this Information upon the following:
I. I, Scott Mann, am a Special Agent with the Utah State Tax Commission's Criminal
Investigation Unit. I am a certified law enforcement officer for the State of Utah with over 33
years of experience, which includes more than 21 years of conducting in-depth white collar fraud
investigations and I currently hold a designation as a Certified Fraud Examiner.

2. I have conducted an investigation into the activities of David M. Rushton who owned
and operated a business listed as Fooptube LLC. As part of my investigation, I have personally
reviewed documents from the Utah Department of Commerce, the U.S. Department of Labor, the
Utah Labor Commission, the Utah Department of Public Safety and the Utah Department of
Workforce Services. As well, I interviewed multiple individuals who were denied their wages by
the defendant individually and/or by and through the business Fooptube, LLC.
3. The files and/or records of the following agencies have been reviewed as part ofmy
investigation:
The Utah State Tax Commission.
The Utah Department of Commerce.
The Utah Department of Public Safety.
The Utah Department of Workforce Services.
The West Valley City Business License Department.
7
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The Utah Labor Commission.
The U.S. Department of Labor.
4. At all times relevant to this Infonnation, the defendant appears to have lived and/or
worked in the State of Utah and at times relevant to this matter the defendant, owned and
managed the business Fooptube L.LC. in the State of Utah.
5. Records of various governmental agencies identify defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON
as the principal/co-principal and/or operator of the business Fooptube LLC offering computer
programming and design services.
6. The defendant began this business on or about January 2005.
7. Interviews with employees and with others confirmed that the defendant managed the
company and was the individual who make decisions relevant to wages, compensation and the
payment of same.
8. During the years 2008 and 2009, the defendant promised wages and compensation to
at least 95 individuals. Those individuals were never or completely compensated consistent with
the information communicated by the defendant.
9. During the years 2008 and 2009, the defendant kept and/or failed to remit wages to the
aforementioned approximately 95 individuals.
·
10. Acting as a fiduciary for said wages/funds, the defendant kept said wages/funds
and/or failed to remit the same to said employees.
11. The defendant accepted the services of said employees during years 2008 and 2009
while knowingly failing to recompense said individuals
12. The results of my investigation show that at or about 95 of the defendant's employee,
or at or about 50% of the defendant's workforce were not paid as required/promised.
13. Moreover, during the same time period, the defendant did compensate/pay the wages
of selected individuals, such as himself, his spouse, family members and other selected
individuals.
14. Utah Labor Commission records, which I personally reviewed, reflect that Fooptube
employees have made wage claims against the company in an amount exceeding $1,170,164.00.
15. I have also reviewed records wherein the defendant David M. Rushton admits that he
failed to pay employee wages.
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16. Furthermore, the same records reflect that the defendant failed to remit funds
collected from employees for the purpose of depositing them into retirement funds (a 401 K
and/or Roth 401K pension fund accounts) that were set up or represented to have been set up at
the Fooptube business for the benefit of the employees.
17. The defendant has admitted to having not remitted funds so withheld on account of
the aforementioned retirement funds and has also admitted that he knew he should have remitted
those funds.
18. In addition to any other unpaid wages, the defendant improperly withheld and failed
to account for funds withheld from employees in/about the amount of$1,214,164.00 (as of
February 2011).

19. The defendant undertook the aforementioned activities as a regular part/pattern of his
business operation and did improperly keep and/or use such funds as part of the funds within and
sustaining his business, Fooptube, LLC.
20. Several attempts had been made by employees and others to ameliorate the situation.
To date, there has been a complete failure by the defendant to respond and/or remedy the
situation concerning unpaid wages and/or the non-funding of the retirement accounts or take any
meaningful steps in that direction.
21. The defendant have used and continued to use the improperly/fraudulently
retained/converted funds, both funds that were due and owing as wages and/or funds that were
part of the employees retirement funds, to further his business enterprise and/or for personal use.
22. The defendant asserted control over the aforementioned business organization and
the funds generated from such organization have been used, at least in part, to help continue such
operation and/or continue the unla~~~ivity.
i ~
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Scott Mann
USTC Investigator, Affiant

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

---
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Jud/claJ District
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APR 14 2D09

MARK BAER #5440
Assistant Attorney General
MARK SHURTLEFF #4666
Attomey General
Attorney For The State of Utah

By_ _ _
sA_LT-~~·..JL..?...:.UN~TY~~Deputy Clerk

160 East 300 South
Salt Jiake City, Utah 84114

Telephone (801)366-0199
IN THE Tl{IRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JNFORMATJ:ON

STATE OFUTAB,
Plaintiff,

v.
MAUREEN D. RUSHTON
DOB:

Crimina~l10Wl/1

DAVID M. RUSHTON
DOB:

Criminahql4Q7Ja=t'O

Defendants.

The undersigned SCOTT MANN, states on information and belief that the defendants
committed the crime(s) of:

COUNT!
OFFENSES RELATING TO TAXATION:
F.AILING TO RENDER PROPER TAX RETURNS (Withholding Tax Returns), a Third
~egree Felony, in Salt Lake <::!ounty, State of Utah, on or before the 31st day of March 2007, 30th
day of June 2007, 30th day of September 2007, the 31 st of December 2007~ the 31 11 day of March
2008, and/or the 30th day of June 2008, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 1101(1)(c),
Utah Code, in that the d~fendants, MAUREEN D·. RUSHTON
DAVID M. RUSHTON, as
parties to the offense, with an intent to evade any tax or requirement of Title 59 or any lawful
requirement of the State Tax Commission, failed to xpake, render sign, or verify any return or to
. supply any information within the time required, or di<l: make, render, sign, verify any false or
fraudulent return or statement, supplied false or fraudulent information; to wit, the defendants
failed to file witpholding tax returns and/or filed a false withholding returns for quarterly
reporting requirements for the tax year(s) 20Q7 through 2008 inclusive.

and

or
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COUNT2

OFFENSES RELATED TO TAXATION:
INTENT TO EVADE (Withholding Taxes) 31 st day of March 2007, 30th day June 2007, 30th
day of September 2007, the 31 st of December 2007, the 31 st day of March 2008, and/ot: the 30th
day of June 2008, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 8, Section llOl(l)(d), Utah Code, the
defendants MAUREEN D. RUSHTON and DAVID M. RUSHTON, as parties to the offense,
intentionally or willfully attempted to evade or defeat a tax or the payment thereof; to wit, the
defendants did take distinct actions and undertook specific acts to evade their withholding tax
obligations in that they did co-mingle funds and/or created false documentation, as well as other
steps to evade the payment of their withholding tax obligations for tax years from 2007 throu~
2008.

of

COUNT3

UNLAWFUL DEALING OF PROPERTY BY A FIDUCIARY (Employees W2
Withholding), a Second Degree Felony, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah on or before the 31st
day of March 2007, 30th day of June 2007, 30th day of September 2007, the 31 st of December
2008, the 31 st day of March 2008, and/or the 30th day of June 2008, in violation of Utah Code
Title 76 Chapter 6 Section 513, inclusive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendants
MAUREEN D. RUSHTON and DAVID M. RUSHTON, as parties to the offense, did deal with
property that has been entrusted to them as fiduciaries, in a manner which they knew was a
violation oftheit duty and which involved substantial risk of loss or•detrimentto the owner(s) or
to a person(s) for whose benefit the property was entrusted, ani:1 the value of the property was or
exceeded $5,000.09; to wit~ the defendants as a fiduciary for their company did obtain and deal
. with witbholding of employee taxes in excess of $5,000.00 and did fail to remit the same to the
State of Utah.
·
COUNT4

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
on or about January 31, 2008 in violation ofUtah Code Title 76 Chapter 10 Section 1801 and
Title 76 Chapter 2 Section 202 defendants, MAUREEN D, RUSHTON and DAVID M..
RUSHTON, as parties to the offense, did devise a scheme or artifice to defraud another or to
obtain m~mey, property, or anything of value fro~ another by false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions, and communicated directly or indirectly with
any person by any means- for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice and
the value oftbe property defrauded or obtained is or exceeds $5,000.00; to -wit, the defendants
devised a scheme or artifice to obtain or defraud money from the State of Utah by issuing
fraudulent W-2 forms and withholding-tax statements to employees for use in filing individual
income tax returns to the State of Utah.
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OF_FENSES RELATING TO TAXATION:
FAILING TO RENDER PROPER TAX RETURNS (Tax Returns -Personal), a Thlrd
Degree Felony, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or before the 15th day of April for each of
the foUowing years, 2006, 2007 and/or 2008, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 8, Section
11 0l(l)(c), Utah Code, in that the defendants, MAUREEN D. RUSHTON and DAVID M.
RUSHTON, as patties to the offense, with an intent to evade any tax or requirement of Title 59
or any ~wful requirement of the State Tax Commission, failed to make, render sign, or verify
any return or to supply any information within the time required, or did make, render, si~
verify any false or fraudl}lent retum or statement, or supplied false or :fraudulent information; to
wit, the defendants failed to file personal income tax returns for the tax year(s) 2005, 2006
and/or 2007.
COUNT6
~

ENGAGING IN A PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTMTY, (RACKETEERING), a
SECOND DEGREE FELONY, a Second Degree Felony, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah on
or about the 31st day of March 2007 through June 2008 in violation ofUtah Code Title 76
Chapter 10 Section 1603, concerning the establishment known as Fooptube LLC, located in or
doing business in Salt Lake County, in that the defendants MAUREEN D. RUSHTON and
DAVID M RUSHTON as a parties to the offense:

J

( ....
~

(1) receiyed proceeds derived, either directly or indirectly, from a pattem·ofunlawful
activity in which the defendants participated as a principal, and 'then used or invested, directly or
indirectly, any part of that income, or the proceeds of the _income, or the proceeds derived from
the investment or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition of any interest in. or the establishment
or operation of, any enterprise; or
·
(3) was employed by or associated with the enterprise, and did conduct or particiP.ate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of that enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful
activity.

Notice of Predicate Offenses:

~

For purposes of establishing defendant's pattern of unlawful activity, the State of Utah

asserts that defendants, MAUREEN D. RUSHTON and DAVID M. RUSHfON, has engaged in
conduct, which constitutes the commission of at least three episodes of unlawful activity, which
conduct is alleged as follows:
~

_;;;

FAILURE TO FILE OR RENDER A PROPER TAX RETURN, two (2) Third Degree
Felony offenses, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for the tax years/periods 2005, 2006,
2007 and/or 2008, hi violation of Utah Code §76-8-ll0l(l)(c).

l
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INTENT TO EVADE, one (1) Second Degree offense, in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, for the tax reporting quarters of 2007, through the first two tax reporting quarters of2008

inclusive, in violation ofUtah Code §76-8-1 lOl(l)(d).

UNLAWFUL DEALING BY A FIDUCIARY, one (1) Second D.egree offense, in Salt
Lake Count, State of Utah, for the tax reporting quarters of years 2007 through the first two
quarters of 2008 inclusive, in violation of Utah Code §76-6-513.
·
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, one (1) Second Degree Felony in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, occurring or about January 31, 2008, in violation of Utah Code §76-10-1801 and
76-2..202.

~·

THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM AN
INVESTIGATION WHICH INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES OR
EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES:
1. Scott Mann, (USTC) Utah State Tax Commission Investigator.
2. Dolores Furness, K~per of the Records, USTC.
3. Utah State Tax Commission, Auditing Department.
4. Keeper of the Records, Utah Department of Commerce.
5. Keeper of Records, -qtah Department of Public Safety.
6. Various employees/former employees ofFooptube LLC.

(~.

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT
Affiant, under oath, bases this Information upon the following:
l. I, Scott Mann, am an investigator with the Utah State Tax Commission's
Criminal Investigation Unit.
·

2. I have reviewed information in my :file and investigated allegations of
violations of the Utah Criminal Code as it relates to taxes and related criminal activity
against the above cited def~dants, MAUREEN D. RUSHTON and DAVID M.
RUSHTON.
·
3. The files and/or records of the following agencies haye been reviewed as part.
of my investigation:
The Utah State Tax Commission.'
The Utah Department of Commerce.
The Utah Department of Public Safety.
The Utah Department of Workforce Services.
The West Valley City Business License Department.
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4. At all times relevant to this Infomiation, the defendants appear to have lived
and/or worked in the Stat~ of Utah and a.t times relevant to this matter the defendants,
owned a business and/or managed or was employed and/or was receiving income in the
State of Utah.
5. Records of various governmental agencies identify defendants MAUREEN D.
RUSHTON and DAVID M. RUSHTON as the owners and/or operators of a business
offering programming and design services, the business being known as Fooptube LLC
and/or was an officer or manager of said business at times relevant to these allegations.
Records of various government agencies indicate that the defendants began this business
on or about January 2005. Interviews with employees, Fooptube LLC's corporate
counsel and with defendant David M. Rushton confirmed that the Rushtons ran the
company.
6, MAUREEN p. RUSHTON AND DAVID M. RUSHTON are and/or have
been husband and wife with a common residence during all times relevant to this matter.
7. The defendants have been principals and/or held themselves out to be a
principal of said business since its creation and in any event at all times relevant to this
Information. The business has operated with as many as 211 employees.

(

.

8. During the course of my investigation I interviewed current and former
employees of Fooptube LLC and reviewed"information obtained that related to
withholding tax~ collected by Fooptube LLC from employees working at the company.

• ,I'

9. That information was cross-referenced with information and records gathered
from the various governmental agencies listed above.

10. The results of this records check shows that the defendants, while
acting as principals with authority over the business of Fooptube LLC, withheld payroll
taxes from individual .employees and held suoli funds as fiduciaries ancl failed to remit
the same to the Utah State Tax Commission.
11. In addition, the defendants failed to file withholding tax returns as required
with the Utah taxing authorities.
12. During the course of my investigation, defendants MAUREEN D.
RUSHTON AND DAVID M. RUSHTON, were infonned and/or became aware of their
failures to file withholding tax returns behalf of the aforementioned business.
Subsequent to that time, the defendants, untimely, filed various withholding tax returns,
however they have failed to remit withheld funds to date.

on

13. Several attempts have been made by representative of the Utah State Tax
Commission to contact the defendants in this case to have the defendants remit or work

l_.
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toward remitting the improperJy held withholding taxes. To date, there has been a failure
to respond and remit the same.
14. For various years before the years included in this Information, the
defendants were informed of their failure to file withholding tax returns an_d/or remit
withholding taxes by and through various civil proceedings at or with the Utah State Tax
Commission. These hearings reiterated and reinforced the defendants' lmowledge of
their obligations and further illustrates that the defendants actions in this matter were
knowingly and/or intentionally committed.
15. In January 2008, Fooptube LLC was required by law to provide W-2 reports
to employees. At tbat time, the defendants communicated, or caused to be
commurricated untruthful/bogus W-2 documents purported to represent the withholding
of Utah state withholding taxes for the time periods· in question in the aggregate amount
ofin excess of $585,917.89 from, at or about, 211 employees ofFooptube LLC.
16. None of the funds referenced in the aforementioned W-2 documents were
ever remitted to the State of Utah.

C..~

17. Nevertheless, based upon the aforementioned bogus W~2 documents and by
and through the filing ofinruvidual tax returns·by the employees ofFooptube, credits
were applied for the benefit of such employees and/or reftmds were mailed out to such
taxpayers, The amount of funds so refunged and/or credited totals in the amount at or
about $585,917.89.

18, The defendants have used and continued to use the improperly/fraudulently
retained/converted funds to further their business enterprise as well as for their personal
use.
19. The defendants had control over the aforementioned·business organization
and the funds generated from such organization have been used, at least in part, to help
continu~ such operation and/or continue the unl~wful criminal activity.
20. The total amount of taxes, interest and penalty that the defendants have failed
to remit now total in or in excess of$1,213,528.02, this amount being calculated to
Februazy 17, 2009.
21. In addition, the defendants failed to file any personal income tax returns for
years 2005, 2006 and/or 2007 despite having income in amounts in excess of the
minimum filing requirement amount. at which point ~clividuals are required to file Utah
state income tax returns; to wit, the withheld withholding taxes alone were in excess of
said minimum requirements, and those improperly retained funds(mcome were only one
component of income attributable to the defendants during that time period.

(... _.
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22. It appears to this affiant that the defendants have, at a minimum, committed
offenses relating to taxation, have unlawfully dealt with monies as fiduciaries, committed
communication fraud with respect to the improper/bogus W-2s and engaged in a pattern
of unlawful activity.
·

~~'½<

Scott Mann
USTC Investigator, Affiant

r""•~::p,-~~~m to before me this~~

----=l6=--~~":i:::, 2009.

Authorized for presentment and filing:
~J".&.l'IIU."'-" SHURTI.,EFF, Attorney General
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February 1, 2011

Repo.-t of Criminal Investigation
Submitted by: Special Agent Scott S. Mann
In re: Case No. 10-009

Name: David M. Rushton
DOB:
SSN:
Address:
Representation: Dat'in Goeff
Disposition: Pending Prosecution

CASE TYPE/ CRIMINAL VIOLATION:

(

This investigation involves charges ofTbeft (76-6-40S UCA), Theft of Services
(76-6-409 UCA), Unlawful Dealing of Property by a Fiduciary (76-6-513 UCA) and
violation of engaging in a Pattern of Unlawful Activity (76-10-1603).

SOURCE OF REFERRAL:
The case was teferred by Assistant Utah Attorney General Ronald V. Ludlow
who is assigned to the Utah Labor Commission and investigators for the U.S. Depa1tment
of Labor Employee Benefits and Security Administration.

VENUE/ JURISDic;fION:

The company was located and operated within Salt Lake County. Any charges
filed in this investigation will be filed in the Third District Court of Utah located in Salt
Lake City.
RELATED CASES:

(

This case relates to CIU Case #08-011 that investigated the subject for theft of
withholding taxes and engaging in patterns of unlawful activity.

[ l]
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CRIMINAL IDSTORY:
The subject was charged by the Utah State Tax Commission's Criminal
Investigation Unit with tax violations ofFailu_re to.File, Tax Evasion, Communication
F1-aud, and Engaging in a -Pattern· of Unlawful Activity. David Rushton pied guilty to one
count of Failure to File and one count of Engaging in a Pattern of Unlawful Activity in
September of2010. The charges against Maureen Rushton were dismissed as part of the
plea negotiations.

INVESTIGATION SUMl\'IARY:
In 2008, the C1·hninal Investigation Unit began an investigation into allegations of
theft of withholding taxes by Fooptube LLC, a company owned and operated by David
M. Rushton and Maureen D. Rushton. During the investigation, the Utah Labor
Commission (ULC) contacted this investigator and advised that the subjects·had
committed theft of services from approximately 84 individuals who had worked for the
company between October 2008 and October 2009. Additional persons reported unpaid
wages since this original contact. As of the date of this report 95 employees have
reported unpaid wages for services provided.

(

The ULC stated that David Rushton and Maurren Rushton had operated Fooptube
LLC in Utah for several yeal's, In 2008 and 2009, the company failed to pay employees
for services l'eceived as 1-equil'ed by Utah State statute. Many Fooptube employees filed
wage claims with the ULC when payroll checks were not issued within the required time
period. These missed pay cover pay periods from October 1, 2008 through December 31
of 2009. While the company was missing payroll fo1· cui·1·ent employees they continued
to hire additional employees and operated through the year of 2009. Eventually 95
employees repot1ed wages of $1,170t164.07 that had not been paid (see section #4). This
summary identifies the claim.ants and the amount wages owed for services provided to
the company.
During this investigation, I became awal'e of a criminal investigation being
conducted by the Department of Labor's Employee Benefits Security Administration
(EBSA) out of San Francisco. This investigation involved allegations that Fooptube had
failed to remit employee's contributions to a traditional 401K a11d Roth 40 lK pension
oplan being operated by Fooptube LLC.

(

According to the EBSA, David Rushton established the plan as an employee
benefit pension plan effective January 1, 2006. David Rushton and Carrie Doulgerak.is
(David Rushton's niece) were established as the plan administrators. The author.iz.ation
of the plan by David Rushton established a fiduciai·y 1-elationship between the employees,
the plan and himself (as the administl'ato1·). The EBSA investigation revealed that
Rushton bad failed to remit contributions to the plan for a period ofFebrua1y 2007
thl'ough October 2008. The total amount diverted from the employees' pension plan is
$107,000.00.
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In the EBSA investigation, EBSA Senior Investigato.1· Negus_$_ie Abraha
interviewed David Rushton on April 28, 2009 at the Residence Inn City Center in Salt
Lake City, Utah. Acopy of the interview report is included in this report (see s~ction
#6). Dur_ing the interview, Rushton. admitted tl~at he knew that be was supposed to .
deposit the funds ~mmediately into the plan's acco~nt, He further admitted that "he ·was
responsible for the decision to delay or not to pay the contributions" (see paragraph #35).
As part ofmy investigation on the theft of withholding taxes, I interviewed
several members of Fooptube LLC's management team, During the interviews it was
determined that the management team were members of Rushton's family. Each of the
individuals stated that David Rushton made the decisions of who was to be paid and who
was not to be paid. During these interviews the management team admitted that many
times the company had .issued payroll checks that they knew could not be covered by the
funds in the bank accounts.
I interviewed the person who was the office manager of Fooptube ftom Febl'uary
2006 through March 2009. She advised that David Rushton made all of the decisions on
who was to be paid and who was not to be paid. She also advised of certain expenses
paid out of company funds to the Rushtons that appeared to be of a personal nature (see
section #7).

(

COMPUTED LOSSES OF WAGES AND PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS:
The ULC said they had received 95 claims fi1ed by employees of Fooptube LLC
for losses of wages. The total losses claimed by employees through the date of this report
total $1,170,164.81. The 95 employees responding to.the survey amount to 47% of the
total numbe1· of known Fooptube LLC employees.
In the issue of the regular 401K and Roth 401K contributions, it was determined
by the BBSA that David Rushton had failed to remit $107,000 in funds to the pension
plan as required by the plan's policy.

TI1e total theft of services and contributions is determined to be $1,214,164.81.
SUBJECT OF INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW:

The subject 1·e:fused to be interviewed by SA Scott Mann on the advice of his
att.orney. However d~t'ing the investigation the subject was interviewed by EBSA
Investigatoi- Negussie Abraha. A copy of this interview report is incorporated into this
report. (see section #6)

3
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ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS
. .I conducted additional interviews in the previous· matter involving Fooptube LLC.
The management team that. was interviewed .included A11thony arid Corrine rushton, Mist
Scott, Hal Rushton Don Milha1:n, and Nadine Milham.
.

~
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EVIDENCE:

I
I
I

i

~

1. Spreadsheets identifying the actual wage claims submitted by individual
employees ofFooptube LLC.
2, Survey results, survey forms, and summary sheet identifying wages clahned to be
owed to vatio~s employees.

3. Interview report/statement ofBBSA Senior Investigator Negussie A Abraha who
interviewed subject David M. Rushton.
4. The admission ofDavid Rushton to owing etnployees wages and 401K funds to
employees
5. Statements ofFooptube LLC management staff that David Rushton made the
decisions on who and what expenses to pay.

Conclusion and Recomn1e11datlons
This investigation disclosed that Fooptube LLC failed to pay wages to employees
of the company as 1·equired by Utah Code section 34-28-5, during the years of 2008
through 2009. The total amount of wages not paid for services provided exceeds
$1,170,164.00. The subject knew that the wol'k being provided was on pay basis and
established wages for individual employees. The failure to pay the wages of some
employees while paying other employees on a continuing basis constitutes a theft of
services in violation of Utah Code section 76-6-409. The subject accomplished the theft
of services by issuing insufficient funds checks to employees and promises to pay.
In addition to failing to pay wages owed to 47% ofhis employees, the subject
David Rushton collected contributions to a regular 401K and a Roth 401K plan, during
the years of2007 and 2008. Rushton then failed to remit the funds to the Pension Plan's
trust account as required by law. The subject thereby bt'eached. bis fiduciary ·
responsibility in remitting the funds collected from employees. The evidence also shows
that his failure to pay the wages of the employees and the failure to remit the pension
funds were intentional. The total amount of funds not remitted to the pension funds is
$107,000.00.

(
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The investigation revealed that numerous people were victimized, the
victimization took place over an extended period of time, and two different schemes were
used to divert funds. These schemes constitute a pattern of unlawful activity in violation·
ofUtah State S.tatute.76-10-1601through 76~10-1603.

,•
I

Based upon the above facts, I recommend that David M. Rushton be prosecuted
under the pmvisions of the following criminal violations, and in con.junction with Utah
State Codes:
Uta~ Criminal Code Ann. § 76-6-409 Theft of Services, a Second-degree
felony, (2) counts,
Utah Criminal Code Ann.§ 76-6-513, Unlawful Dealing of Property by a
Fiduciary, a Second-degree felony, (2) count.s.

Utah Criminal Code Ann.§ 76-10-1603, Conducting a Pattern of Unlawful
Activity, a Second-degree felony, (1) counts.
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